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Abstract

Donald E. Bindler Jr.
The current system of controlling oil spills involves a complex relationship of
international, federal and state law, which has not proven to be very effective. The multiple
layers of regulation often leave shipowners unsure of the laws facing them. Funhennore, nations
have had difficulty enforcing these legal requirements. This thesis deals with the role marine
insurance can play within the existing system of legislation to provide a strong preventative
influence that is simple and cost- effective to enforce.
In principle, insurance has two ways of enforcing higher safety standards and limiting the
risk of an accident occurring. The first is through the use of insurance premiums that are based

on the level of care taken by the insured. This means that a person engaging in riskier behavior
faces a higher insurance premium, because their actions increase the probability of an accident
occurring. The second method, available to the insurer, is collectively known as cancellation
provisions or underwriting clauses. These are clauses written into an insurance contract that
invalidates the agreement when certain conditions are Dot met by the insured The problem has
been that obtaining information about the behavior of an insured party requires monitoring and
that incurs a cost to the insurer.
The application of these principles proves to be a more complicated matter. The modem
marine insurance industry is a complicated system of multiple contracts, through different
insurers, that covers the many facets of oil transportation, Their business practices have resulted
in policy packages that cross the neat bounds of individual, specific insurance coverage. This
paper shows that insurance can improve safety standards in three general areas - crew training,
hull and equipment construction and maintenance, and routing schemes and exclusionary zones.
With crew, hull and equipment, underwriting clauses can be used to ensure that minimum
standards are met by the insured. Premiums can then be structured to reflect the additional care
taken by the insured above and beyond these minimum standards. Routing schemes are traffic
flow systems applied to congested waterways, such as the entrance to New York harbor. Using
natural obstacles or manmade dividers, ships are separated into two lanes of opposing traffic,
similar to a road. Exclusionary zones are marine areas designated off limits to tanker traffic
either because of a sensitive ecosystem or because local knowledge is required of the region to
ensure safe navigation. Underwriting clauses can be used to nullify an insurance contract when a
tanker is not in compliance with established exclusionary zones or routing schemes.
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On January 5, 1993, the Braer, a Liberian registered but U.S. owned, single-hulled
supertanker, followed a westward course through a 22 mile wide, international shipping lane just
South of the Shetland Islands in route from Norway to Canada The Shetland Islands, belonging
to Scotland, are rocky outeroppings 200 miles off the Scottish coast in the wind-swept and
storm-battered North Sea. The Braer carried 26 million gallons of light crude oil.! Battling a
fierce winter storm, the tanker's fuel lines became contaminated with water, causing engine
failure. At the time, she was 11 miles South of the Shetland Islands. The crew was unable to
lower the anchor due to the engine failure. Rescue teams on tugs and in helicopters were
successful in saving all 34 crew members, but after 5 hours of attempts they failed to secure a
line to the tanker and drag it to safety. Within an hour, the southwesterly winds had swept the
ship into Garth's Ness, a rocky headland at the southern tip of the island.., and impaled it on the
rocks.
On this rocky coast, the Braer came to rest, spilling millions of gallons of oil into the
ocean. Heavy seas and hurricane force winds beat upon the tanker, preventing a salvage attempt.
The majority of the cargo still on board, locals and officials prayed that she would remain intact
and not break apart. Four days later, on January 9, the stem succumbed to the storms and broke
off. However, officials remained hopeful, because some of the cargo holds still had not broken
up and the majority of oil still remained in the ship. By this time, the storm had spread the
spilled oil 25 miles up the coast and distributed an oily spray over 15 square miles of the island.
The saga was to continue for another three days. Finally on the 12th, after several hours of 30'
surf and 95 mile/hour winds, the Braer split apart and spilled the rest of its 26 million gallon
cargo into the sea. By now a slick spread across 45 miles of coastline.
1 One ton

of oil is approximately equivalent to 300 gallons. As such, the Braer was carrying 85,000 tons of oil.
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The Shetland Islanders are a tough, rugged people, resembling the coastline they inhabit.
During the winter months, fierce storms that would drive most people behind closed doors
become a common part of their daily lives. However, the wreck of the Braer and its effects
were a test even for these people. Throughout the week-long drama, massive waves of brown oil
thundered into the rocky beaches, sending a mist of oil across the southern end of the islands.
Up to 25 miles away, a sheen covered the environment. The air took on the stench and taste of
the crude. The residents began to complain of stinging eyes and throats, headaches, and nausea.
A concern for human health grew, and officials recommended that children, pregnant women,
and people with respiratory diseases remain indoors. Respiratory masks were handed out free of
charge, and residents were advised to use them when out of doors.
The highly toxic light crude had untold additional effects on the surrounding
environment The area chiefly affected by the spill, especially Sunburgh Head, is a rich natural
environment on the flyway of numerous bird species. It also supports a rich marine estuary that
provides a home to seals and sea otters. The beaches were laid

(0

waste, while death tolls rose.

The estimates reported that up to 6,000 birds died from the spill (Wells 1993f, p. AlO). Seals
and sea otters began to turn up dead or contaminated and suffering from the toxicity of the oil.
The disaster also wreaked havoc on other marine species, possibly threatening the vital Salmon
stocks. For all this damage, the true catastrophe is that the oil may contaminate the ecosystem
for up

(0

a decade as toxins work through the food chain (Clancy 1993b, p. 7).

The spill caused additional damage to the local economy. Sixteen local salmon farms
were temporarily barred by the government from selling fish (Wells 1993b, p. All). This
presen ts an estimated $15 million of immediate losses (Wells 1993 b, p. All). Furthermore, the
major food retail chains of Marks & Spencer and Tesco temporarily stopped buying Shetland
Islands salmon (Clancy and Hornsby 1993, p. 1). These sanctions could have potentially
crippled the £34 million a year industry that is life blood to the islands (Clancy and Hornsby
1993, p. 1). Commercial fishermen also suffered lost revenues from a restriction prohibiting
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fishing within a 50 mile radius of the spill (Wells 1993b, p. All). Farmers were forced to move
sheep herds inland, and 11 vegetable fanners had their crops condemned due to oil
contamination. Regardless of the long term consequences, the local residents suffered economic
damages from the immediate impact of the spill.
As is typical, numerous questions arose in the aftermath of the spill. Did the crew
abandon the tanker too early? Did the captain wait too long before seeking help? Should the
captain have chosen this route through an environmentally sensitive area during severe weather
conditions? For that matter, being in legal international shipping lanes. did the captain have any
incentive to follow a safer but longer and more costly route? Would a small independent
generator to operate the anchor in emergencies have kept the ship from drifting into the rocks?
Finally, would the tanker have been better off turning back? All these questions lead to a central
unanswered issue: Could the spill of the Braer have been prevented? And, if so, why wasn't it?
The flood of criticism and questioning forced the British Government to search for
answers. The track of questioning focused on whether or not British shipping laws provide
sufficient environmental protection. Should older ships be banned from British waters? Should
the 22 mile lane South of the Shetlands be open to tanker traffic? Does the government need to
establish stricter standards? But these are all details of the larger issues, and the answers are in
knowing the right questions to ask. At a news conference on the day after the Braer broke apart,
Prince Philip directed his attention at the important issues. He asked, "Are the crews properly
trained? Are they [ships] maintained properly? To what extent do flags of convenience mean
you can opt out of regulations?" (Schmidt
issue:

1993~

p . A14). To these, we must add one other

Should tankers be restricted from using waters near environmentally sensitive

ecosystems?
The Braer spill is just one incident of a larger, more serious problem to which an
adequate solution has not been found. Although a considerable reduction in marine oil pollution
has occurred over the last decade, the volume of spilled oil still remains far too high. In the last

3

four years alone, spills from the Exxon Valdez and Mega Borg , two other supertankers, have
again drawn the world's anention to this visible problem. By their very nature, accidents involve
uncontrollable risks and can never be completely eliminated. As such, our goal in reducing
accidental pollution to acceptable levels must be to minimize the controllable risks. This leads to
the central focus of this thesis: Can international regulations and national legislation adequately
enforce more rigorous safety standards, and if not, what means do we have of ensuring greater
environmental protection?
Recognizing the pivotal role of national legislation in the global approach to controlling
oil spills, this paper uses the United States as a case study. The U.S. leads the way in landmark
oil pollution legislation with the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA). The OPA takes a giant step
forward in requiring higher safety measures and achieves some of the goals discussed above.
However, the act has already come under criticism. Many tankers are refusing to transport oil to
the U.S. for fear of the tremendous liability limits outlined by the OPA. The act is also
insufficient in establishing stringent enough standards in some areas and difficult to enforce.
Clearly, legislation alone is not the answer. What then will enable us to achieve and enforce our
standards?
The focus of this thesis is the role marine insurance can play in reducing maritime oil
pollution by enforcing higher levels of safety. As stated above, insurance is not a solution in
itself but rather must work with established international treaties and national legislation. Under
these conditions, insurance can satisfy its primary purpose of providing compensation to injured
parties and still act as a strong preventative influence. This paper looks at where insurance fits
into the existing international framework. Furthermore, I show what safety conditions insurance
can and should improve upon and how it can influence these aims. Finally, I demonstrate that
insurance can meet these aims in an economically cost-effective way that can benefit the
environment, the insured and the insurers.
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Ultimately, I generalize the results of the U.S. case study to the global context, The
lessons learned are applied to suggest legislation foreign governments must enact to provide an
efficient means of pollution control when used in conjunction with insurance. Furthermore, I
will analyze the potential role of insurance in enforcing legislation and, where necessary, in

substituting for government imposed standards.

Overview
I attempt to achieve two goals by the end of this thesis. The first is to recommend a
means of achieving and enforcing improved safety standards.

Specifically, I offer two

suggestions: The modifications that must be made to existing legislation, and the structure of
effective insurance contracts. I conclude this paper by answering the two questions posed in the
opening paragraphs: (I) What role should marine insurance play in controlling pollution from
marine oil spills? (2) How closely does our current system approximate this ideal? The analysis
begins with a look at insurance on a theoretical basis. By obtaining an understanding of how
liability and premiums affect risk, the principle can better be applied to our real world model of
marine oil pollution. This can be accomplished by incorporating the theoretical concepts with a
discussion of regulatory provisions and marine insurance contracts.
The next section examines the causes and consequences of oil spills. This discussion
motivates my thesis by providing an understanding of the magnitude and severity of the marine
oil pollution problem. The two causes of pollution, operational and accidental losses, are briefly
outlined. By definition, accidental losses are self-explanatory. Operational losses result from the
normal operations of the tanker. This thesis is primarily concerned with accidental losses. Oil
pollution has both economic and non-economic effects. Economically, spilled oil can directly
affect the community through lost resources, but it also has indirect effects in many forms, such
as medical bills from health problems relating to a spill. People also suffer psychological effects
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from lost natural resources that cannot be quantified in economic terms. The section concludes
by providing a brief overview of the international shipping industry.
The next section of the thesis describes the regulatory history and structure of oil
pollution legislation and enforcement. Flags of convenience, monitoring agencies and insurance
registers are explained.

Furthermore, I focus on the inadequate control they provide in

preventing oil pollution. Important international treaties, such as The International Convention
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and The Protocol of 1978 relating to the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, are discussed. These conventions relate
directly to the establishment of liability limits, insurance standards, and inspection requirements
for tankers. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 is also outlined here. The inadequacy of legislation
alone as a control method is reviewed.
At this point, the paper turns its attention to a conceptual model of insurance's ability to
prevent pollution by minimizing risk. The core of this discussion is Steven Shavell's model of
risk, liability and insurance. I have incorporated into this a model of insurance with the threat of

bankruptcy. The issues of moral hazard and adverse selection are also debated. This results in a
theoretical example of the interaction of regulation, liability and insurance in reducing risk. I
deal with both the preventative influences of this interaction and the incentives to the insurance
industry.
It is necessary to include a description of the marine insurance industry and the
complicated nature of the contracts. By incorporating this with our knowledge of the regulatory
history, they can be applied to the theoretical model so as to achieve a real world means of
control. The thesis specifically focuses on the improvement of personnel, hull and construction
standards and the establishment of routing schemes and avoidance clauses. With our concepts
established. an application of the policies to a specific situation is presented. In conclusion, I
apply the findings to answer the questions that have already been posed.
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The Causes .a!lll Consequences mOO fuli.!ls
Accord ing to the US Na tional Academy of Sciences , 81% of the o il spi lled into the sea
originates fro m mari time transport (OECD 1991, p. 74). In other words, of the 1.84 mi llion
to ns/year of oil sp ille d on average, 1.49 mi llion tons come from tanker transport [F ig ure I J.
Tanker pollution can be d ivided into two categories - accidental and operationa l losses. The
maj o rity of poll utio n results from the latter. In general, these spills can result in extensive
en vironmental and economic dam ages. Beyond the obvious clean- up co sts, the loss of valuable
marine species and lost touri sm and commercial revenues can cause a negative economic impact
o n loc al comm unities. Th e po ll utio n also results in ab und ant environme ntal damage th at is
difficult to monetize . 2

Figure 1 . Marine Origin of Oil Pollution of the Seas

Eros ion, natural flows
0.30 (16%)
Production platform
0 .05 (3%)

Operational Iran port

Accidental transport

losses l. 08 (59%)

losse s 0.4 1 (22%)

Fro m US National Academy of Sciences.

2 Cleanup and containment methods arc important, and often debated. issues in the oil pollution problem. Howe ver,
a discussion of them has irucmionally been excluded from this thes is and left for other auth ors. Th is paper is
concerned with preventative mean s of red ucing oil pollution. For a detai led analysis of oil spill clean up measures
sec U.S. Congrc s. Office of Technology Assessment, Coping Wilh A n Oiled Sea : An Analysis of Oil Spill Response
Technologies .

7

Accidental and Operational Causes
Deballasting and tank washing, the major causes of operational discharges, contribute
59% or about 1.08 million tons/year of the marine oil pollution from tankers (OECD 1991, p.
74). In contrast, accidents account for only about 22% or approximately Al million tons/year
[Figure 1] (OECD 1991, p. 74). To quote Abecassis, "The tarball on your beach is far more
likely to have been caused by an operational discharge of oil from a ship than by oil from
casualty" (Dowling, p. 3). However, the concentrated nature of accidental spills can inflict
environmental disaster on affected areas. As such, they often draw greater attention from the
world media (Timagenis 1980, p. 3). The increased volume of oil transported at sea compounds
both problems. In this paper, I am concerned with insurance's effect on controlling accidental
losses.
Although the number of accidental oil spills decreased dramatically in the 1980's
compared with the 1970's, accident rates have been increasing since 1989 ("Britain In Brief'
1993, p. 7). In 1984, 10,360 spills were reported to the US Coast Guard (Council 1989, p. 48).
This is down from the 15,330 reported in -1977 (Council 1989, p. 48). Included in these statistics
are the handful of major spills annually that can have devastating effects on the local
environment These few incidents often account for the majority of the oil spilled accidentally
(Council 1989, p. 48). Throughout the 19805, on average approximately ten spills were over 700
tons/year (DECO 1991, p. 74). Table 1 is a list of selected accidental oil spills throughout the
world. The U.S. Congress reports that usually no more than 10 to 15 percent of the oil is
recovered from a large spill. and with technical improvements we still cannot expect that out
response efforts will typically lead to even half the oil being recovered from a large spill in the
future (U.S. Congress 1990, p. 1).
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Operational Losses
Operational pollution arises during normal tanker procedures. It occurs from both
automatic releases in response to safety mechanisms as well as intentional discharges (Tirnagenis
1980, p. 18). Tankers traditionally wash cargo holds of remaining oil or 'clingage' with sea
water; furthermore, the tanks are often used to hold water as ballast on return journeys. During
deba1lasting and washing, the water is jettisoned back into the sea along with accumulated oil
residue. The Load On Top (LOT) system bas significantly reduced pollution from 'clingage'
(Abecassis 1976, p. 5), but greater improvements in ship design and on-shore reception facilities
for waste residue are needed to fully combat the problem (Timagenis 1980, p. 18).

Under the LOT system, a slop tank is incorporated in a tanker's construction. Ballast and
washing residue gets stored in the slop tank; here the oil settles on top and can be removed to
reception facilities (Abecassis 1976, p. 16).

While the introduction of this technique

significantly reduced operational pollution, it was estimated that as of 1976 105,000 tons of oil
were still discharged annually (Abecassis 1976, p. 16). Several shortfalls exist within the
system. On short hauls the oil does not have time to settle in the slop tank (Abecassis 1976, p.
16). In addition, even the LOT process still discharges some oily/water mixtures into the sea
(Abecassis 1976, p. 16), in part due to the lack of existing operational reception facilities.

Accidental Losses
The Marine Directorate of the British Department of Transport uses the following
definition for marine accidents:
"Shipping casualties are that special class of notifiable accident in which a
ship is involved in any incident that results in injury to persons or damage to
property... ~ (1991, p. 1)

Accidents can be further classified as collisions, strandings or founderings. Collisions have been
found to cause the greatest amount ofpoUution (Abecassis 1976, p. 19). The Directorate, in their
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study of The Human Element in Shi~pin~ Casualties, has found that human error plays one of the
largest roles in marine accidents (Marine 1991, p. v). In 90% of all collisions and groundings

Table 1. Selected Accidental Oil Spills
Date

Name of Ship

Hag

Coontry Affected

1967

March

JW1e
November
March
December
January

Torrey Canyon
World Glory

Keo

Liberia
Liberia
Liberia

UK,France

1968

Ennerdale

UK

Chrissi

Year

1969
1970
1971

February
1972
1974

1975

1976

1977

1978
1979

1980
1983

1984
1985

March
July
December
June
August
January
January
January
April
April
May
June
December
February
December
March
July
December
April
July
September
November
November
February
August
January
December
February

December

1989

March

1990

JW1e
December

1992

1993

January

Independenta

Panama
USA
Liberia
USA
Norway
South Korea
Canada
DUlCh Antilles
Japan
UK
Denmark:
USA, Liberia
Liberia
USA
Greece
Spain
USA
Liberia
Liberia
Panama
Liberia
Chile
Greece
Liberia
Greece
USA
Liberia
Romania

Irenes Serenade

Greece

Castellode Belver

Spain

Oregon Standard
Wafra
Texas Oklahoma
Tarnano
Sea Star
Imperial Samia
Metula
Yugo Maru 10
British Ambassador
Jakob Maersk
CorinthoslE.M. Queeny
Spartan Lady
Shell Barge No.2
Epic Colocoltroni
Urquiola

Nepco 140
Argo Merchant
HawaiianPatriot
Grand Zenith
Amoco Cadiz
Cabo Tamar
Andros Patria
Gino
AtlanticExpress
Chevron Hawaii
Burmah Agate

Assirni

PericlesGC
Nepnmia
Nova
Exxon Valdez
Mega Borg
Braer
A\2&eaD Sea
Maersk Navigator

South Africa
USA
SeycheUes
USA
USA
South Africa
USA
USA (Maine)
GuIfofOman
Canada, USA
Chile

(From OECD 1991, p. 75 and A S1llil A Minute 1993, p. 43)
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121.2
45.0

25.0
49.0
31.0
7.7
632

35.0
3.6
120.3
6.0

Japan

53.5
50.0

Japan (Pacific)

45.0

Portugal

84.0
40.0
25.0

USA (Delaware)
USA
USA
sc Dominique
Spain

USA., Canada
USA(MA)
Honolulu (pacific)
USA(MA)
France

Chile
Spain
France

Tobago
USA
USA (fexas)
Turkey

Greece
South Africa
Oman

Liberia
Liberia
USA
Norway
Liberia
Greek
Singapore

Quantity Spilled
(I ,000 tons)

Qatar
Iran
Iran
USA (Alaska)
USA
UK (Shetlands)

Spain
Indonesia

57.0
1Ol.0
12

28.0
99.0
29.0
228.0
60.0
47.0
42.0
276.0
2.0
40.0
94.6
102.0

255.5
51.4
46.6
60.0
71.1

35.0
85.0
73.0
26.0

and 75% of all contacts and explosions where enough information was available to make a
judgment, the human element contributed, at least in part, to the resulting casualty (Marine 1991,

p. 2). However, the entire problem cannot be blamed on the crew. Investigations following the
Exxon Valdez spill, for example, have indicated that equipment and procedures are often highly
contributing factors.
The likelihood of an accident increases greatly in ports. rivers and approaches due to

increased traffic and more difficult navigation (Marine 1991. p. 17). Vessels operating in short
sea trades have the highest accident rates due to their close proximity to land (Marine 1991. p.

25). Adverse weather conditions have also been found to playa pan in accident causality
(Abecassis 1976, p. 18). Experts have suggested the need for higher standards of safety,
construction and manning (Timagenis 1980, p. 19). According to a Marine Directorate study, the
most important current need is for supervised practice of skills as opposed to increasing formal
training (1991, p. 18).

Furthermore, while crews have sufficient access to navigation

information, radar misinterpretation still remains common (Marine 1991, p. 17). This call s for an
improvement in the terminals relaying data and supports the need for increasing practice of
skills.

Environmental Effects and Economic Impact
To coastal residents, the physical effects of marine pollution are overwhelmingly evident,

as they can see. feel and smell the petroleum products that permeate global coastlines (Abecassis
1976, p. 1). The UN Department of Marine Pollution defines pollution as, "the introduction by
man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment resulting in such
deleterious effects as harm to living resources, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine
activities including fishing, impairment of quality for use of sea water, and reduction of
amenities" (UN Doc. A/CONF 48/8. para 1197). It damages on three levels:

11

biological,

economic and amenity.

The Council on Environmental Quality (1989, p. 50) lists seven

pathways by which spilled oil can effect a living organism:
1. Direct lethal toxicity;

2. Sub-lethal disruption of physiological or behavioral activities;
3. Direct coating;
4. The contamination of the food chain by hydrocarbons;
5. Changes in biological habitats;
6. Changes in species diversity and density patterns;

7. Coating of the air/water surface,
Economically, marine pollution has the most serious effect on fisheries and recreation
(Fallon 1973, p. 1). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimates that commercial
fishing, navigation and recreation lost between $61.9 - $110.8 million in 1970 alone as a result
(Fallon 1973, p. 2). Petroleum products biodegrade but often never completely, and very little is
known about the long-term biological effects (Abecassis 1976, p. 27). These damage estimates,
as large as they are, understate the true damage since they fail to take in to account the loss of
'quality of life' suffered by local beach residents and fishermen. To illustrate a spill's deleterious
consequences, it is useful to consider the effects of one large spill.
During the early morning hours on the night of 16-17 March 1978. the Amoco Cadiz
drove aground 1.5 nautical miles off the coast of Portsall, France. Over the course of a mere 14
days, the Cadiz spilled all 230,000 tons of light petroleum, its entire cargo, into the sea off the
Brittany coast (Lauber 1982, p. 93). The spill affected diverse oceanic and tidal ecosystems,
destroying marine and shore life in its path. Unfortunately, the ecological effects were only pan
of the suffering. With regional industry based on the sea, economic hardship followed in the
spill's wake.
West to east winds carried the cargo from the Amoco Cadiz ashore over more than 300
kilometers of the French Coast (Grigalunas 1982, p. 91). Of the 230,000 tons of oil on board,
32% (74,000 tons) evaporated, 33% (76,000 tons) were lost at sea, and 35% (80,000 tons)
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washed ashore (Grigalunas 1982, p. 91). Thirty to 35% of the entire cargo consisted of highly
toxic, aromatic petroleum (Lauber 1982, p. 95). Studies concluded that coastal pollution in mud
flats and abers? could persist for up to 10 years (Lauber 1982, p. 97).
The area suffered, as Lauber terms it, a "sharp mortality crisis" that killed sea urchins,
cockles, razor-clams, clams and crustaceans, to name a few (1982, p. 100). Within a several
kilometer radius of the wreck all species died out, including waterfowl and shore birds (Lauber
1982, p. 1(0). The oyster beds of the region became heavily contaminated, and 6,000 tons of
oysters had to be destroyed (Lauber 1982, p. 103). The economic costs were appallingly evident
to this region which was heavily dependent on the industries of oyster production, fishing and
tourism. Of those surveyed, many Bretons reported job loss for up to two months (Sorenson
1982, p. 107). In purely quantitative terms, the spill cost:
The fishing industry up to 20 mil. Francs;
350,000 man-days of army labor and 35,000 of voluntary labor;

France, in total, an excess of 500 million Francs
(Sorenson 1982, p. 110-112).
The psychological costs, though very real, can never be quantified..
The Amoco Cadiz was not the first major spill and is certainly not the last As such, it
provides a helpful understanding of the impact that a major spill can have on a geographic and
economic region. The people of Valdez, Alaska and the Shetland Islands will all tell the same
story of economic and psychological hardship.s But, statistics can never tell the whole story.
Innumerable damages arise from the pollution caused by accidental and operational losses of oil
that are difficult to monetize.f The tarball we encountered on the beach or the soiled wetlands
where we frequently enjoyed an afternoon of birding both diminish the utilirys we receive from
the use of these ecosystems but do not necessarily impose a financial cost. Suffice it to say, oil
3 An aber is the mouth of a river or convergenceof two rivers.
4 The regions were effected by the spill of the Exxon Valda and Braer respectively
5 The method of contingent valuationattempts to impose a monetary value on these losses. For a discussion of this
conceptsee Tieteaberg, Environmental and Natural Resource ECOMmiCS. p. 80-1.
6 Pindyckdefines utility as, ..the level of satisfaction that a person gets from consuming a good or undertaking an
activity" (p, 81). For a more detailed discussionof utility see Pindyck and Rubinfeld, Microeconomics. p, 81-6.
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pollution from tankers, although reduced, remains at an unacceptable level that causes significant
economic and psychological hardship. As Zagaski states, "Carrying deadly cargo in massive
bulk through biologically important waters, the supertankers of today are fragile and unwieldy
vessels capable of mass destruction" (1992, p. 144).

The Transport of Oil by Sea
From the late 1970's until the mid-Btl's, the percent of oil transported by sea steadily
decreased. A low of 44% of oil was transported by sea in 1986 compared with 58% in 1977
(Walder 1990, p. 642). This represents a decrease of 430 million tons (Walder 1990, p. 642).
However, since then the trend has reversed itself, reaching highs in the late 1980's and early
1990's. Imports of crude oil into the United States was at a high of 2,151 million barrels
annually in 1990, up from 1,168 million barrels in 1985 (Statistical Abstract 1992, p. 572).7
Funhermore, a low of 10.61 quadrillion BTU's of petroleum were imported into the U.S. in
1985; this reached a high of 17.16 quadrillion BTU's in 1989 <Statistical Abstract 1992, p. 563).8
In 1990, 16.94 quadrillion BTU's of petroleum were imported into the United States (Statistical
Abstract 1992, p. 563). Oil shipping rates have fallen to a low of $12.00 a ton in 1991 from a
high of $69.40 a ton in 1973 ("Britain In Brief' 1993, p. 7).
The Middle East is the largest annual exporter of crude oil and finished petroleum
products (Walder 1990, p. 652). In 1986, it exported 539.3 million tons (Walder 1990, p. 652).
Western Europe, likewise, is the largest importer, bringing in 435.4 million tons in 1986 (Walder
1990, p. 653). The United States, Japan and Latin America follow in second, third and fourth
place respectively in imports of oil products (Walder 1990, p. 643).

7 Approximately 42 gallons of oil are in a barreL
8 A BTU is me amount of energy required to raise the temperature of 1 pond of water 1 degree Fahrenheit at a
temperature of 39.2 degrees Fahrenheit The conversion for the production of petroleum is 5.800 million BTU's per
barrel (Statistical Abstract 1m. p. 561).
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As of 1989, the world fleet of registered tankers over 1,000 gross tons numbered 5,133
(Statistical Abstract 1992, p. 637). The United States is currently ranked sixth in number of
registered tankers with 239 (Statistical Abstract 1992, p. 637). Panama has the greatest number
at 590, followed closely behind by Liberia with 574 (Statistical Abstract 1992, p. 637). The
average age of the U.S. fleet is 19 years, compared with 14 years for the world's fleet (Statistical
Abstract 1992, p. 637). The flagships of this fleet are known as Ultra Large Crude Carriers
(ULCC) and often referred to as "supertankers". They can reach up to 1/4 mile long, draw up to
90 feet, and displace 640,000 tons (Zagaski 1992, p. 145). From a top speed of 15 to 16 knots, it
takes up to 20 minutes and 3 miles to bring to a complete stop (Zagaski 1992, p. 145).
The tremendous volume of oil transported by this international fleet often leads to
congested ports and harbors, where petroleum is an important commodity. On average, U.S.
harbors experience daily traffic of 50 tankers and 450 million gallons ("Big Drop.." 1992, p. 31).
New York alone transfers more than one million barrels of oil daily to and from storage facilities
(Zagaski 1992, p. 146). This exceeds 18 billion gallons per year transferred through New York
(Zagaski 1992, p. 146). The Strait of Dover is an excellent example of the congestion in
shipping lanes. It is not unknown to have up to 20 ships passing in each direction at one time
through the Strait (Abecassis 1976, p. 39).

Regulatory History awl Structure
The discharge of oil from tankers over the last half decade has brought publicity to the
growing problem of marine oil pollution 'as a serious environmental threat Onternational
Enyironment 1992, p. 324). Numerous international treaties and national legislative acts have
been enacted to address this growing concern. As is typical of international law, the international
agreements often carry very little inherent enforcement power and mainly serve to set precedents
for standards of pollution prevention. To have any effective power, the treaties need to be
ratified by the national governments of the signatory nations, with the agreement that the flag
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nation of a ship will enforce the international standards in a national court Since the majority of
marine oil pollution occurs in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and not the international ocean,
national legislation of the state within which a ship is operating, incorporating the principles of
the international conventions, creates the most powerful legal structure to enforce the
agreements. 9 As will be discussed below, this potential is not always fulfilled. t O
The general principles can be applied to foreign and international waters without
consequence provided that two conditions are met. To have legal control within their EEZ, a
nation must incorporate a marine pollution act into national legislation. Secondly, accidents
occurring in international waters can only be properly dealt with if the principal multilateral
treaties are ratified by the majority of shipping and coastal nations and signatory nations agree to
legally enforce the established standards.

International Agreements
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969 (CLC) - The CLC
(8 Il.M 453) sets an important precedent in defining liability and insurance standards for tankers
(specifically those carrying more than 2,000 tons bulk: oil). The convention states that owners
are held strictly liable for pollution damage from their ship, with three exceptions: (1) An act of
war; (2) third-party intent to cause harm; (3) negligence on the part of a government in
maintaining navigational aids (Article III). The convention applies to "any persistent oils such as
crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil, lubricating oil and whale oil," (Article 1.5). Furthermore,
limits to liability are set at 210 million Francs per accident (Article V, Subsection 1), unless the
accident occurs due to the owner's negligence or willful intent to cause harm (Article V,
Subsection 2).

Additional compensation must be paid by the owners of the oil (Inter

9 Only 3.5% of the mean volume of oil spilled between 1976 and 1984 occurred in tbe open ocean, according to the
Council on Environmental Quality. Environmental J:rmds, 1989.
10Numerous prominent international conventions on maritime concerns,such as the United Nations Conference on
the Law of lbe Sea, 1982,have intentionally been left out of lbe discussion for their lack of relevant concern with
issues of liability or limited effectiveness due to the fact that they have not been ratified by the United States,
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Departmental Group 1979, p. 4). The CLC also requires proof of insurance or financial security
(Article VIT, Subsection 1) and gives permission to national governments to ensure that such
proof is met (Article Vll, Subsection 11). However, in practice the CLC has very little effective
force and was never ratified by the United States government.
Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the Prevention

0/ Pollution from

Ships, 1973 (MARPOL 73/78) - Annex 1 deals with oil pollution of the marine environment.
MARPOL 73{78 (17 ll..M 546), significantly, outlines survey and inspection requirements
(Regulation 4), establishing design, construction and operation standards for all ships. It also
sets up the use of an International Oil Pollution Prevention Certificate in accordance with the
safety standards of Regulation 4 (Regulation 5, 8 and Appendix Il). The certificate serves as a
means of assuring compliance with the outlined standards and has a five year duration. A flag
state is required to inspect all ships for certification purposes and conduct two additional
inspections during the certification period Qntemational Enyjronment 1992, p. 16). Furthermore,
regulation 13 requires the use of segregated ballast tanks on new tankers carrying over 20,000
tons. MARPOL has greater international legal significance particularly for the United States.
The U.S. ratified Annex 1 of the treaty, putting it into force in October 1983. Annex 1 has been
ratified by a total of 61 nations (International Environment 1992, p. 14).

National Legislation
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) 
The intention of this U.S. law (42 USC §§9601-9675) was to establish the authority and
financing for cleaning up hazardous waste sites in the United States. The act holds private
parties responsible for clean-up costs. Though not directly concerned with oil spills, CERCLA is
significant because Subchapter IV establishes an important precedent by authorizing the sale of
pollution liability insurance in the United States.
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Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) - The Act (33 USC 2701) sets all statutory precedents for oil
pollution damage occuning within the Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States. The
intent of the OPA was, "To establish limitations on liability for damages resulting from oil
pollution, to establish a fund for the payment of compensation for such damages, and for other
purposes.' It defines "responsible party" for a vessel as the person owning or operating the
vessel (Sec. 1001,32). Furthermore, it states, "each responsible party for a vessel...is liable for
the removal costs and damages" (Sec. 1002, a). Damage costs are defined as damage caused to
natural resources, real or personal property, subsistence use, revenues, profits and earning
capacity and public services (Sec. 1002, b). However, liability for damages and removal costs is
limited to $10,000,000 for vessels greater than 3,000 gross tons and $2,000,000 for vessels 3,000
gross tons or less (Sec. 1004. a, 1). The limitation only applies to vessels exercising due care,
showing no form of gross negligence or willful misconduct and operating under all Federal
regulations (Sec. 1004, c). The Act also incorporates the precedent set by the CLC into U.S. law
and requires all tank vessels to maintain evidence of financial responsibility.

Financial

responsibility is demonstrated by proving a capability to meet the maximum liability standards
established by section 1004 (a) (Sec. 1016, a). The United States reserves the right to either
withhold clearance from, deny entry to, detain or seize any vessel not possessing such evidence
of financial responsibility (Sec. 1016, b). The OPA preserves the right of states to impose
additional liability requirements in addition to those that must be demonstrated in accordance
with Federal law (Sec. 1018) Finally, the Oil Pollution Act sets construction, safety and crew
standards for all vessels including foreign ships (Title IV, Subtitle A) and initiates a study to
investigate the use of traffic routing schemes in U.S. waters (Sec. 4107). Specifically, all vessels
greater than 5,000 gross tons operating in the EEZ of the U.S. must have double hulls by Jan . I,
2015 (Sec. 4115). In addition, the OPA mandates another study to determine whether existing
standards (including standards for crew size. training, inspections and navigational equipment)
are sufficient for safe navigation in U.S. waters (Sec. 4111).
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Stale Law
Maine, Massachusetts, and New York State Law

~

Legislation in these three states illustrates the

complications arising from the interaction of state and Federal legislation. In contrast with the
OPA, both Maine and Massachusens impose unlimited liability on the responsible party for all
damages and cleanup costs resulting from a spill (Zagaski 1992, p. 153). New York law goes
even further and has more intricate requirements regarding environmental damages. It has
established a compensation fund for spill cleanup and removal costs (Zagaski 1992, p. 148). In
tum, responsible parties are liable for reimbursing the fund, additional penalties and additional

costs (Zagaski 1992, p. 148). Furthermore, due

to

the high volume of tanker traffic in New York

Harbor, the state has established a separate set of requirements that are deemed necessary for
transit in the harbor (Zagaski 1992, p. 148). According to Zagaski, "A common element in these
laws was to establish strict liability for pollution damages and to set limits of liability to be
backed up by insurance or some other allowable means of security," ( 1992, p. 149).

The Inadequacy of Control
The overlapping and inconsistent jurisdictions of international agreements and Federal
legislation causes untold complexities and confusion.

Furthermore, this patchwork of

approaches results in greater cost burdens. As such, in the United States a tanker is faced with
Federal and state regulations, as well as international agreements, all of which are often making
contradictory demands (Anderson 1992, p. A14). As Anderson points out, it is not any particular
regulation that is harmful, but the multiple layers of regulation (1992, p. A14). Under such
conditions, a tanker operating in the U.S. EEZ often faces almost unlimited liability (Anderson
1992, p. AI4).
The Royal Dutch/Shell Group has stopped using tankers that they own or manage to
transport heavy oil to the

U.s.

(Wald 1990a. p. A27). As a company spokesman stated, "A

shipowner who is involved in a pollution incident in the U.S.A. even when he has behaved

19

properly, responsibly and without negligence may face largely uninsurable exposure to claims
which far outweigh the potential commercial reward for such trade," (Wald 1990a, p. A27). By
using independent tankers, Royal Dutch reduces its risk because the OPA places no liability on
cargo owners. Oil owners are actually encouraged to minimize costs by hiring the cheapest
tankers, often with lower standards. Furthermore, Protection and Indemnity clubs have also

begun to rethink the risk of insuring tankers operating in U.S. waters (Anderson 1992, p. A 14).
Unfortunately, the relatively recent enactment of the Oil Pollution Act means that we
have no long term data with which to monitor its effectiveness or problems. However, as we can
see it has already come under considerable fire. Chief among the criticisms is its failure to take

in the former considerations and work within the established framework, Rather, the OPA exists
in a vacuum.

The act has also received criticism for allowing claimants to directly sue

underwriters for clean-up costs and damages (Anderson 1992, p. A14). This has lead to nearly a
doubling of insurance premiums and a 10% increase in shipping charges, as insurers and tanker
owners respectively try to cover the higher cost of increased risks. In addition, it is worth noting
that while the OPA prohibits vessels from foreign countries with lenient standards from
operating within U.S. waters, it does not have the ability to ensure that established standards are
actually enforced. As such, the open registry system allows foreign ships to operate in U.S.
waters that do not meet the minimum requirements established by the OPA.
The problem is exacerbated when the maritime nations are failing to inspect ships. Oil
companies. at the inquiry into the Braer spill, reported that "20% or more of the world's tankers
do not meet existing internationally agreed standards," ("Britain In Brief" 1993, p. 7). With
decreasing shipping rates, many owners are cutting corners on safety, because both flag and port
states are failing to inspect adequately ("Britain In Brief' 1993, p. 7). Furthermore, governing
international organizations, such as the International Maritime Organization (!MO), have
difficulty monitoring compliance with multinational treaties like MARPOL. Only about 23% of
the participating nations met MARPOL's reporting requirements and submitted the proper
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summary reports in 1989 Qnternational Enyjronment 1992, p. 26). These nations make up only
about 27% of the world's gross shipping tonnageGnternational Environment 1992, p. 26).
In summary, the existing policy context fails in four ways. It fails to establish jurisdiction
in many situations. This is partIy because legislation like the OPA does not adequately consider

the existing legislative context in which it operates. The result is that tankers often face
unlimited liability and uninsurable risks, which causes the costs of operation to become
prohibitive. Finally, both national governments and international organizations have had
difficulty enforcing and monitoring established standards.

Regulatory Structure
I conclude by discussing the institutional structure within which insurance must operate.
Enforcement agencies (such as the U.S. Coast Guard), insurance registries and flags of
convenience for ships all playa major role in the potential effectiveness of insurance. In order to
concentrate on insurance's precautionary incentives, it is necessary to discuss the role that public
policy plays along with insurance in the regulatory framework. The Coast Guard and insurance
registries are the two most prominent monitoring structures in this country. Flags of convenience
are hotly debated, because they provide a loophole for shippers trying to cut costly safety
standards. With each, I review the inadequate means of control it offers in promoting increased
safety standards on ships.

Fhzgs ofConvenience
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas obligates all states to set conditions for
ships to gain nationality and registration but requires a "genuine link" between the ship and state
(Article 5). The issue of defining "genuine link" was hotly debated and resolved by allowing
each state to decide on its meaning. As Stopford explains, "Ship registration conveys nationality
to a ship and brings it

within the regime of the national law of the country of registration," (1988,
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p. 152). Furthermore, this, ''process makes the ship an extension of national territory while it is
in international waters," (Stopford 1988, p. 157). This declaration of nationality is necessary for

legal and commercial purposes when ships are engaging in international trade (Stopford 1988, p.
159).
A nation's registry can be separated into one of two categories - open or closed. A closed
register is open only to shipowners with the same nationality as the register. On the other hand,
open registers are available to anyone provided that the provisions of the registry are met
(Stopford 1988, p. 159). Furthermore, there are two sub-categories of open registers - national
and international. A national register treats a shipowner the same as any other business in the
country (Stopford 1988, p. 160). An international register offers special competitive terms to
attract shipowners, with the goal of earning additional revenue for the state (Stopford 1988, p.
160). International open registers are what is commonly referred to as "open registers" or "flags
of convenience". Due to the vast differences in the enforcement of international standards
between flags of convenience, they have become an important issue in pollution control.
Ships have increasingly turned to using these international open registers either for their
tax incentives or because they are unable to meet the safety requirements of a more stringent

nation. The flags of convenience offer advantages in four areas - tax, crewing, company law, and
safety standards. Stopford (1988, p. 161) discusses these issues below:

* Tax - No taxes are placed on profits or fiscal controls. The only tax is the
subscription tax per net registered ton.

* Crewing - The shipping company has complete freedom to recruit
internationally. It is not required to employ high-wage nationals, as either
officers or crew. However, regulations regarding crew standards and training
may be enforced, depending on the policy of the register.

* Company Law - As a rule, the shipping company is given considerable
freedom over its corporate activities. For example, ownership of the stock in
the company need not be disclosed; shares are often in 'bearer' form, which
means that they belong to the person who holds them; liability can be limited
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to a one-ship company; and the company is not required to produce audit
accounts. Few regulations address the appointment of directors and the
administration of business.

* Safety Standards - International open registers vary widely in the extent to
which they enforce safety standards for the ships on the register. Some
enforce high standards, while others leave safety entirely to the shipowner.
Any of these four advantages may motivate a shipowner to register in a nation that enforces lax
standards. but it is specifically crewing requirements and safety standards that are of concern
when it comes to marine oil pollution. The loopholes found in using flags of convenience enable
ships to circumvent to some degree the stringent standards found in international legislation and
in much of the national legislation of prominent industrial nations. As the prominent industrial

nations have made a move to place even greater restrictions on crew and safety standards, flags
of convenience have become ever more attractive to shipowners, which causes even greater
concern. Roger Kohn of the International Maritime Organization points out that, 'There is a
concern about standards generally. The number of countries operating ships are increasing and
they have not had the experience of the maritime nations;' (U Accident Highlights ..." 1993, p. 2).
Numerous safety issues can be affected by flags of convenience from ship construction to
training standards. For example, by not requiring officers or crew from a specific nation, a
shipowner operating under a flag of convenience has greater freedom to pick a crew from a
country with less stringent training requirements. Flags of convenience can negatively affect the
operation of a ship as well. It has often been observed, for example, that vessels registered under
international open registers tend to purchase three-day weather forecasts as opposed to the more
expensive ten day forecasts (Jenkins 1993b, p. 2). The possible disastrous results of limited
weather forecasts are self-evident. The International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) also
has numerous complaints with international open registers because owners have greater freedom
in choosing and compensating crews (Stopford 1988, p. 163). The ITF has established a
recommended wage scale for crews and offers a 'blue card" to all ships in compliance with the
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scale (Stopford 1988, p. 163). Many ships operating under flags of convenience do not possess
blue cards. The ITF has compiled a list of nations classified as flags of convenience.
The two most prominent and widely used international open registries are Liberia and
Panama. Liberia has a total of 1,587 ships and Panama a total of 5,203; combined this amounts
to 23% of the world fleet (Stopford 1988, p. 164).11 Both nations developed registers for the
purpose of attracting foreign shipowners and did so by establishing economically attractive
requirements. Liberia has been a popular register since 1949, when many shipowners were
attracted to it by the low fees, absence of Liberian taxes, and no crew or operating restrictions
(Stopford 1988, p. 158). Unlike many flags of convenience, Liberia enforces some operational
safety standards, but even these can vary widely. Liberia does not conduct the necessary surveys
and examinations of ships but contracts them out to foreign commercial organizations (Jenkins
1993b, p. 2). This creates a problem because these organizations, known as classification
societies, have varying standards and the international community has no confidence in the actual
safety of the vessels (Jenkins 1993b, p. 2). Add the fact that Liberia is a nation without a
maritime tradition and is in a political state of anarchy, and it is not difficult to see why control is
lax. However, it is easy to see why a country such as Liberia is an attractive register. According
to Jenkins, a ship registered in the UK with a UK crew would cost approximately £2,300/day

(l993b, p. 2). This is a dramatic difference when compared to the £8oo/day it would cost to
operate a ship under Liberian registry with a Filipino crew (Jenkins 1993b, p. 2). After the Braer
disaster, Andrew Linington, a spokesman for the merchant navy officers' union Numast, pointed
out that, .....65% of losses occur with ships over 16 years old and Liberia has one of the worst
casualty records of the 150 maritime nations."

11 Thesefigures

are from Lloyd's Registerof Shipping.
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The U.S. Coast Guard and Other Enforcement Agencies 12
Most of the 150 maritime nations have an established agency which enforces maritime
law, including national and international legislation regarding oil pollution. The duties of these
organizations involve both preventative and cleanup measures. They are required to monitor and
inspect ships operating within the EEZ of the nation, as well as playa supervisory role in cleanup
after an accident. The Coast Guard serves this role in the United States. Many of the major
maritime nations, such as England and Germany, have similar organizations, but some of the
international open registers, such as Liberia, do not have a federally appointed monitoring
agency and are forced to rely on commercial inspection agencies. In Britain, only 30% of
foreign ships that come into port are inspected (Jenkins 1993b, p.2).13 At the inquiry into the

Braer spill, the Chamber of Shipping, representing UK operators and owners, "accused
governments of lacking the resources and the will to police ship safety properly," ("Britain In
Brief' 1993, p. 7).
With regard to oil pollution prevention in the United States, the Coast Guard carries out
the provisions outlined in the OPA. They not only monitor and inspect ships of U.S. registry but
are also entitled to carry out inspections of all tankers operating in U.S. waters. The Coast Guard
carries out annual official examinations of all tankers and further random unofficial examinations
(Belkin 1990a, p. Dl2). Unfortunately, the resources of the Coast Guard are far too limited to
effectively implement all the standards outlined by the OPA ("On The Agenda" 1993, p. 4). The
time and money dedicated to oil pollution prevention is severely limited and must be shared with
the other duties of the Guard. such as marine safety and drug enforcement Furthermore, when
dealing with oil pollution, prevention is not even their primary concern. After the disastrous
response by the Coast Guard after the Exxon Valdez spill, media and government attention has
turned to developing a comprehensive spill response and cleanup program. As

SUCh,

the Guard

12 Mark A. Cohen discusses the optimal oil spill preventionenforcementstrategy for a government regulator, in his
article "Optimal EnforcementStrategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Applicationof a Principal-Agent Model with Moral
Hazard", The article appears in The Journal of Law & Economics, April 1987.
13 Of this 30%. 60% are found to have defects (Jenkins 1993b, p. 2).
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has diverted valuable time and money away from prevention towards developing and
implementing this cleanup program ("On The Agenda" 1993, p. 4).

Insurance Registers
Insurance registers are private regulatory organizations that act independently of insurers
and are popularly known as classification societies. They "classify" ships by monitoring their
design, construction and maintenance in order to ensure that minimum standards are met (Cheit,
p. 13). In turn, insurers rely on this information when writing contracts on vessels. Lloyd's
Register (LR) was the first and is still the most prominent classification society in the world. It
maintains a database that includes a register of over 74,000 vessels (Cheit, p. 13). Furthermore,
information on shipowners, new ship construction and reponed casualties are kept in the
database, and it tracks the movement of 30,000 ships across the world's oceans (Cheit, p. 13).
The U.S. version of Lloyd's Register is the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS). Since its
inception, the ABS has shifted its attention to vessel standards alone and now largely ignores
personnel standards (Cheit, p. 14).

Including these two principal societies, approximately 30

insurance registers exist worldwide (Cheit, p. 15).

In 1939, the major classification societies banded together to form the International
Association of Classification Societies (lACS), which has nine full and three associate members
(Cheit, p. 16). The lACS has been helpful in many ways. It has made significant progress in
establishing global safety standards and, in many situations, is able to enforce international
agreements faster than participating nations can (Cheit, p. 16-7). The effectiveness of the IACS
is due to the support of the insurance industry. Many marine insurers require that their insured
ships be classified by an lACS member, and the majority of the world's oil tankers are classified
by members of the IACS (Cheit, p. 16).

Insurance registers provide a valuable service when monitoring ships. However, this
monitoring often comes at a significant cost. By requiring ships to be classified within an
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approved society, insurers can obtain valuable and costly information about the safety standards
of a vessel. Unfortunately. the cost of monitoring actually acts as a negative incentive to
classification societies. They do not obtain any significant advantage by ensuring that ship
minimizes its risk. Being independent profit-maximizing firms, classification societies naturally
desire to minimize their costs. This provides a positive incentive for them to require fewer
qualifications for a ship to meet classification standards and also promotes the use of cost-cutting
procedures when surveying a ship. The final influence for higher safety standards in order to
prevent oil pollution must still rest with the insurers, and they are entailed to ensure that the
registers monitor for such standards. The bottom line is that the insurer must have the incentive
to reduce risks.

It is easy to see many examples of classification societies having insufficient standards or
monitoring procedures. The simple fact is that many sub-standard ships are classified and at sea
(Cheit, p. 17). Part of the problem results from the fact that many IACS standards are left to the
interpretation of the on-site surveyor. This naturally leads to a wide fluctuation in the safety
level of classified ships despite global .stan dards. Furthermore, the registers are primarily
concerned with vessel standards and often fail to inspect onboard equipment, design or crew
training safety levels (Cheit, p. 19). Ironically and sadly, crews and equipment failure are often
the primary causes of many accidents (Cheit, p. 19-20). The societies also completely fail to
provide any form of comparative safety information that is extremely valuable in determining
risk-based premiums. The Tanker Advisory Center (TAC) points out the differences in standards
between IACS members; the Bureau Veritas of France has twice the loss record of other IACS
registers (Cheit, p. 18). In addition, in 1988 the London Maritime Association published a list of
"ships that had been found to be wasted or seriously defective though recently surveyed and still
in class with their classification society," (Cheit, p. 18).
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Iht Control Policy framework: A Conceotual Overview
The interaction of regulation, liability and insurance potentially creates a highly effective
means of reducing pollution generated by the maritime transport of oil.

Regulation, the

collective implementation of international treaties, national legislation and state legislation
outlines enforceable strategies for preventing pollution and accidents. It also serves to assign
liability in situations where pollution occurs. Liability, likewise, internalizes the costs of
pollution damages. Insurance not only assures financial compensation for victims of pollution
damage, since most liable parties do not possess sufficient capital to ensure payment, but it also
can playa role in preventing accidental and operational pollution and through contractual means
in preserving precautionary incentives. The preventative and compensatory roles of insurance

traditionally have been viewed as mutually exclusive - a problem known as moral hazard.
Before we look at the specific ways in which marine insurance can interact with
legislation to reduce maritime oil pollution, the concepts of moral hazard and adverse selection
must be reviewed. Both of these issues are central to any consideration of insurance and in many
ways the focus of this paper. By minimizing both problems through the careful design of
insurance contracts, many of the desired solutions are automatically achieved. An economic
model derives the precise relationships among efficient risk allocation, liability and insurance, in
general. The theory outlines the behavior of the insurer and insured in the context of taking
precautions in the face of an environmental risk.

Moral Hazard
The moral hazard problem arises when the insured, through their level of care, can affect
both the magnitude and the probability of risk that an accident or other event requiring an

insurance payment will occur.

Without information by the insurer on the level of care

maintained by the insured, a fully insured party may engage in riskier behavior after acquiring
insurance because the more hazardous behavior provides no additional risk to the insured and
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indeed may lower their costs. Theft is an excellent example of how moral hazard can effect a
person's behavior. Without insurance, they are inclined to bear certain costs to reduce the risk of
the uninsured object being stolen. However, if a policy can be purchased with a premium less
than the cost of self-insurance, the insured party is less inclined to take the same precautions to

guard against the theft of the object In fact, a fully insured party that cannot be monitored by the
insurer bears no uninsured risk at all; the risk is initially felt by the insurance company in the

form of increased claims and eventually passed to all insured as higher premiums. Therefore, a
profit-maximizing insurer must compensate by setting premiums that reflect the higher
probabili ty of loss due to moral hazard (Cooter 1988, p. 66).
The solution to the moral hazard problem requires that the insurers have the capability to
monitor the behavior of the insured party. In such a way, the insurer has four means of
minimizing the moral hazard dilemma. Coinsurance and deductibles minimize the problem "by

having the insured participate in coverage of his potential losses and thus to induce him not to
change his behavior after the purchase of insurance," (Cooter 1988, p. 66). Coinsurance is where
the insured bears a fixed percentage of the loss, and deductibles are where the insured bears a
fixed amount of the loss and the insurer covers losses above and beyond the deductible.
Cancellation provisions are a third means of solving moral hazard. These are situations written
into the policy where the insurer is not liable for the 10SS. 14 Moral hazard can also be minimized
when insurance premiums can directly reflect the level of care taken by the insured ~ reducing
risk. Once premiums reflect risk, riskier behavior provides additional cost to the insured through
higher premiums. 15

14 Two examples of this are when life insurance is not paid in the case of suicide, or fire insurance is not paid when

losses area result of arson.
15 For example. the insurer lowers fire insurance premiums when smoke detectors are installed in a building.
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Adverse Selection

A second problem that insurers must face when writing insurance contracts is known as
adverse selection. Insurers use a technique in determining premiums known as the law of
averages, that is to say that their ability to predict the probability of a certain loss for a group is

based on the average for that group . It is difficult for insurers to distinguish accurately between
low- and high-risk individuals. However, let us assume that an individual seeking insurance
knows better than the insurer his risk of a loss. In such away. a premium set on the average may
impel only high risk parties to buy insurance. This is because the premium will be too high for
low-risk people and too low for high-risk. Adverse selection occurs when the sale of insurance
leads only to high-risk individuals purchasing policies. This can result in no insurance being
sold because the costs to the insurer of distinguishing between parties' risk behavior is too high
(Cooter 1988, p. 67). Fire insurance is a good example of the effect of adverse selection. A
fireman, for example, who has taken every available safety precaution in his home, including fire
extinguishers and smoke detectors, may be inclined not to purchase fire insurance because he
feels the premiums are too high. This is because the premiums are set on the average and
compensate for high-risk individuals who have not taken the same precautions. However, an
arsonist, planning to torch his home, will certainly seek to insure it for more than the market
value. If the premium is based on the average probability of a loss, then the arsonist will
cenainly find it to be an excellent value, but the fireman will not As a result only arsonists will

buy the policy.
Insurers can use the same methods to combat adverse selection as used for fighting moral
hazard.

Coinsurance and deductibles are effective because high-risk parties find policies

containing them less attractive (Cooter 1988, p. 67). Exclusionary clauses are also potent in that
they exclude the insurer from outlined risks. For example, our fire insurance policy may contain
a provision that the insurer is not liable to compensate for damages caused by arson. Finally, by
monitoring the behavior of the insured, it is easier for an insurer to tie higher premiums into
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higher-risk individuals.

In this case, the fireman would receive premium reductions for

implementing and maintaining these safety precautions.

An Economic Model of Insurance, Risk and Liability
The model used in this paper is adapted from models by Steven Shavell and Robert
Cooter. They explicitly deal with the relationships among insurance, risk and liability, and
insurance and bankruptcy respectively. Together, they create a mathematical model that can be
applied to answer many of the fundamental questions concerning the appropriate allocation of
risk. and precautionary behavior. These questions are the motivating influence behind the
application of the model. As such, the presentation of the following section builds upon itself in
an attempt to answer successive questions. What is the insured's likely behavior toward risk?
Given this risk behavior, can insurance effectively minimize moral hazard and adverse selection?
Is it in the economic interest of utility maximizing insurers and insureds to minimize these
problems? How will cancellation provisions affect the behavior of the insured? How will
bankruptcy affect their behavior as it pertains to the purchase of insurance?

ShaveU's Model ofRisk, Liability and Insurance
In Economic Analysis Qf Accident Law. Steven Shavell of Harvard University presents a
theoretical model of the allocation of risk by means of liability and insurance. The propositions
proven by the model offer interesting answers to many of the questions posed in the preceding
section. This section presents some of Shavell 's conclusions and relates them to my thesis. For
any proof, please consult the aforementioned text The majority of the mathematical results are
the direct work of Shavell and should be attributed as such. except where noted. The numbers
pertaining to the formulas and propositions in the text have citations that differ from Shavell's
work

SO as

to provide the reader with a text that flows easier.
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I have presented the model in a slightly different format from when it was originally
published. Shavell looks at all conditions and compares them to the socially ideal solution. I
have tried to adapt the model to provide an analysis closer to the real-world. Latter pans of the
model build upon the conclusions of earlier sections.

IhJ:. Optimal Allocation a.fRiM:.
How will a rational person behave toward risk? To find an answer to this question, it is
necessary to consider the effects that wealth and changes in wealth have on a person's behavior.
Suppose risk is allocated between two parties, U and V. The following definitions apply:
u« = wealth of U if there is no loss, u... ~ 0;
tu = wealth of U if there is a loss, ui ~ 0 ~

U

=

utility function of U:

v.. = wealth of V if there is no loss, v.. ~ O~
VI

=wealth of V if there is a loss,

VI ~

0;

V = utility function of V;

w = total wealth to be allocated if there is no loss;

w - I = wealth to be allocated if there is a loss, w -I > 0;
p = probability of a loss, 0 S pSI ;
I = the total amount of the loss:
(1)
(2)

u...+v" = W
US+VI

= w-[

Formulas 1 and 2 have straightforward meanings. 1 says that the total wealth allocated
when there is no loss is equal to the wealth of U and V together. The total wealth after a loss is
equal to the total wealth before the loss minus the amount of the loss. As defined by 2, this is
equal to the wealth ofU and V after the loss.
The expected utilities will be:

EU = (1- p)U(u...) + pU(UJ)
EV = (1- p)V(V...) + pV(VI)
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(3)
(4)

In this model, utility is a function of wealth. In other words, to maximize her utility she
maximizes her wealth. Therefore, the expected utility for both U and V is the probability of a
loss (in terms of a percentage) times their utility after a loss plus the probability of no loss times
their utility before a loss.
The desired solution is to:
max EV subject to EU=k and (1) and (2)
Substituting we get:

EU = (1- p)U(w - VII) + pU(w-!- VI)
Optimization Conditions
Solving this maximization problem is achieved by setting up a Lagrangian function and deriving
the first-order conditions. The Lagrangian function is:

Z = EV -A[EU -k]
Z = (1- P)V(VII) + pV(vr) - A[(l- p)U(w- VII) + pU(w-!- VI)- k]
Taking the partial derivatives with respect to

A.,

VII, and VI

(5)

we arrive at:

2J.. = (1- p)U(w- VII) + pU(w -1- VI) - k = 0
Z.... =(1- P)V'(VII) + l(l- P)U'(w - VII) =0
2.. = pV'(VI) + ApU'(W-!- VI) = 0
Setting the partial derivatives equal and solving we arrive at the result:

V'(VII)
U'(w-v..)
U'(u...)
--=
= -'---"V'(VI) U'(w-l-vl) U'(UI)

(6)

Proposition 1: In a Pareto optimal allocation, (a) if one party is risk adverse and the other is risk
neutral, the risk-neutral party will bear all the risk of loss, whereas (b) if both parties are risk
adverse, each will bear a positive part of the loss. (c) If both parties are risk-neutral, then any
allocation is Pareto-optimal. (Shavell1987, p. 201)

Corollary (to Proposition 1): Both parties, U and V. will behave as if risk-adverse.
Since a risk-neutral party is forced to bear all losses, a person is essentially forced to
behave as if risk-adverse. The threat of greater liability. in this case losses, is sufficient threat
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to

modify a person's behavior. This conclusion supports the logical and hypothetical asswnption
that a rational person is adverse to risk. This result brings us to our next question.
The TheQry ojInswance

Assuming that all rational parties behave as if risk-adverse, can insurance minimize moral hazard
and adverse selection by basing premiums on the amount of risk taken by the insured? To
answer that question, I begin with the following assumptions made for this section:
1) All parties face independent risks.
2) There are no administrative costs. 16
3) The insurer covers costs by charging premiums equal to the expected

payments.
4) As shown in the previous section, we will assume the insured to be risk

adverse.
The following definitions also apply:

= utility function of the insured;
w = initial wealth of the insured, W> 0;
n = premium for insurance, n ~ 0;

W

Q =

level of coverage,

Q 2::

0;

To derive a benchmark, consider the first case where:

The Insured Cannot Influence Risk
W - 1r

= wealth without a loss

w - n + q -I

=wealth with a loss

This says that an insured person's wealth before a loss is equal to his initial wealth minus
the premium paid for insurance. His wealth after a loss is equal to his wealth before the loss
minus the amount of the loss plus the amount of coverage (the wealth reimbursed by the insurer).
The expected utility of W will be:

EW = (1- p)W(w-n)+ pW(w-n+q-I)

(7)

16 As staledabove, this model simulates the real world. but still abstracts certain conditions. In a real-world
situation insurerswould likely face administrative costs. Furthermore, separateparties might face the same risk in
some situations. However,this does not reduce the usefulness of our model. Theoreticalconditionsoften produce
results startlingly applicable to the real world.
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Since the insured cannot influence the risk of a loss, the premium must equal the insurers
expected payments which are the level of coverage times the probability of a loss occurring and
the coverage being paid out. As such:

n= pq
Optimization is derived by maximizing expected utility subject to this constraint. As
such, 7T: = pq is substituted into (7) for which q is chosen to maximize the equation. The utility
maximization problem, assuming the second-order conditions hold, becomes:

rnaxEW = (1- p)W(w- pq) + pW(w- pq + q-I)
q

Maximizing this function with respect to q, the level of coverage, yields:
£W" = (1- p)W'{w - pq)(-p) + pW'(w- pq + q -/)(1- p) = 0
Therefore

pq = w- pq+q-l
q-l=O
w-

(8)

q=1

PrQpOSirioD.2: Under the expected utility maximizing insurance policy, when the insured cannot
influence the level of risk, the level of coverage (q) will be full. In other words, the level of
coverage equals the loss.

(Shavell1987.-p.203)

Corollmy 2: With more than one insured party, the total level of coverage equals total losses.!?
This motivates the question: Can the insured influence the level of risk? We can answer

this without the model. For our purposes, the answer is yes. While not being able to eliminate
all risks, insured parties can sufficiently effect the level of risk and being risk-adverse minimize
the risks they face. For example, installing fire extinguishers certainly reduce the risks of a home
being destroyed from a small kitchen fire getting out of control. In terms of oil transportation, a
crew with better knowledge of local waters reduces the risk of a tanker running aground. As
such, we tum the attention of the model to the situation where the insured can influence risk.
We are now more concerned with the behavior of the insurer. This motivates the next question.

The Insured Can Influence the Level ofRisk

Can risk based premiums minimize moral hazard and adverse selection? To answer this
question, the following terms must be defmed:
17 I adapted the corollary from Shavell's results,
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x = the insured's level of care, measured as the cost of care
p(x)

= the probability of a loss given the level of care

The expected utility function becomes:

EW = [1- p(x)]W(w-n-x)+ p(x)W(w- tc-r x +q -1)

(9)

To carry this analysis further, it is necessary to distinguish between two cases. The first
is where the insurer cannot observe the level of care taken by the insured. In the second case, the
insurer can now observe the level of care of the insured.

Two assumptions must hold:
1) The premium cannot depend on x , because the insurer cannot observe the

level of care taken by the insured.
2) This being the case, if coverage, q, is purchased there is no reduction in the
premium by increasing the level of care.
The expected utility function is still:

EW = [1- p(x)]W(w-n-:x) + p(x)W(w-n - x + q -I)

(10)

Since care cannot be observed, n remains constant
However, the following assertion must hold:
1) Although the premium is not a direct function of the probability of a loss times
the coverage, it must still obey n = p(x)q in principle. This is necessary
for the insurer to cover costs.
In other words, the insurer must set the premium to equal the average probability of a loss

times the coverage. This is the concept discussed earlier known as the law of averages. The
average information for a large population is readily available to the insurer. The insurer cannot
base the premium on the individual's level of care, because that information is not readily
available. However, if the insurer is to stay in business it is necessary to cover costs, and that
means setting the premium based on the average level of care of the population.
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If we assume that the expected utility function is maximized over x alone:
maxEW

"
The utility maximizing function can be rewrinen:

EW== W(w- n-x)- p(x)W(w- n-x)+ p(x)W(w- n- x+ q-i)
Maximizing with respect to x :
£W" =

-[1- p(x)]W'(w- tt> x)- p'(x)W(w-7r-x)- p(x)W'(w-7r-X +q- /)
+p'(x)W(w- n-x+q-l):: 0

As such,
p'(xXW(W -7r- X+ q -/)- W(w - n-x)]::

[1- p(x)]W'(w-7r- x)+ p(x)W'(w-n- x + q -

/)

(11)

I am assuming that initial wealth, W, and the amount of losses, 1, are exogenous variables
and are respectively predetermined and uncontrollable by an individual. The individual buys an
insurance policy. The premium, n, and coverage, q, are determined and cannot be affected by
the insured. The insurance policy can be referred to as (n,q). In maximizing (10), the firstorder condition tells us that (11) must hold. The level of care chosen to maximize (0) must
satisfy (11) and as such is a function of the insurance policy and the chosen q and
of care is a function of coverage and the premium and can be wrinen as x(n,q).

Jr.

The level

The second assertion that must hold is that:
2) The level of care taken by the insured is a function of his coverage and
premium and can be written as x(n, q).

In fact, we can say that the level of care taken by the insured is a negative function of his
coverage and premium. The greater the coverage the less care the insured is likely to take in
reducing risks. Furthermore, higher premiums discourage parties, who take greater care, from
buying insurance, while it encourages parties engaged in overly risky behavior.
Keeping the above assumptions and assertions in mind, the expected utility maximizing
insurance policy is found by:

37

maxEW

subject to x(n,q)

:>:

and also subject to n = p(x)q .
Since x(Jr,q) we may rewriteJr =: p(x)q as:
Jr =

p( x( x, q))q

(12)

n is in other words a direct function of q and may be written as Jr( q).
Therefore,

x(n(q),q) = x(q)

and x is a direct function of q.
Reduced to the simple utility maximization problem:

max
EW = [1- p(x(q))]w(w- Jr(q) - x(q)) + p(x(q))W(w-n(q)- x(q) + q -I)
q
Maximizing this function with respect to q yields:

EW" = p'x'[W(w- n x + q -I) - W(w-n-x)]
-x'[(I- p)W'(w-n- x) + pW'(w- Jr- x + q-l)]
r

-x'p' q[(I- p)W'(w-n- x) + pW'(w- n> x + q -1)]

-p[(l- p)W'(w - Jr:- x) + pW'(w- n- x+ q -I)]
+pW'(w-n-x+q-i)= 0
From this equation it can be shown that q«l under general conditions, but that q
approaches I as the cost of taking care,
minimize p(x)l + x .18

x , falls toward zero. Furthermore, x will not

Proposition.3.: Assuming that the insurer cannot observe the level of care taken by the insured,
under the expected utility maximizing insurance policy, the level of coverage will generally be
less than full and the level of care will generally Dot minimize the sum of expected losses plus
the cost of care. (ShavellI987, p. 205)
Shavell attaches the following remark.:

1) With q < I, the insured has an incentive to choose a positive x lowering the premium
rate. If q =: I, then x = 0 and x = p(O)/.

18 For proofof this see ShaveU 1979.
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b Ill.e Insurer Qul Observe ~ ~...Qf ~ Iakkn
If the insurer can observe x, then the premium can be based upon x, as such:
tr

= p(x)q

(13)

This says that the premium is a function of the probability of a loss times the level of
coverage of the insurance policy.
Being so, we want to max EW subject to (13).
Substituting (13) can be substituted into (9) the problem becomes:

rnaxEW = [1- p(x)JW(w- p(x)q -x}+ p(x)W(w- p(x)q - x + q-l)
q

Maximizing with respect to q , the level of coverage, yields:

EWq == [1- p(x)]W'(w - p(x)q -x)(-p(x») + p(x)W'(w- p(x)q - x+ q - /Xl- p(x)] = 0
This reduces to:

w- p(x)q-x+q-/ = w- p(x)q-x
q-/=O
(14)

q=/
The level of coverage again equals losses.
By substituting / in for q :

EW == [1- p(x)]W(w- p(x)/ - x) + p(x)W(w - p(x)/ -x)
The insured now desires to maximize this equation over x given an initial wealth

W ,

which

becomes a problem of:

minp(x)/+x
The insured desires to minimize the sum of expected losses and the cost of the given level
of care.

Proposition 4,: Assuming the insurer can observe the level of care taken by the insured, if the
premium is a function of the probability of a loss given the insured's level of care times
coverage, then under an expected utility maximizing insurance policy the level of coverage will
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be full and the level of care will minimize the sum of the insured's expected losses and the cost

of care. (Shavell 1987, p. 204)
The important implication is that full coverage does not create a negative incentive for
safety if care affects the premium. Both the moral hazard and adverse selection dilemmas can be
solved if premiums are determined in a particular way. The solution is that the premium
structure incorporate specific information on the level of safety observed by the policy holder
and not just aggregate information. As such, negative behavior increases the premium and
higher premiums discourage negative behavior.
Since the premium is affected by the insured's level of care, a negative incentive to
reduce care is created. Furthermore, Proposition 4 shows that the compensatory aims of an
insurance contract are not reduced, because the level of coverage is full. When the insurer can
observe the level of care and sets premium accordingly, moral hazard and adverse selection are
minimized. Potentially conflicting aims, the preventative and compensatory goals of an
insurance policy, can simultaneously be satisfied.

Un fortunately , obtaining full or even

imperfect information requires inspectionsand monitoring, which generate additional costs. Is it
in the interest of the insurance agency to bear such costs?
Corollary (to Proposition 4): The insured is willing to pay an additional amount, beyond the
cost of taking care, for the insurer to obtain information about the level of care taken by the
insured.
When the reduction in premium (due to the higher level of care) exceeds the monitoring
costs, the insured can actually save money even if they pay for the monitoring. Furthermore, the
insured is willing to pay a positive but lesser amount for the insurer to obtain imperfect
information about x .
The theory reveals that the monitoring costs, or at least a substantial portion of the costs,
can be transferred directly to the insured. When the insurer is unable to observe the level of care
taken by the insured, the insured has a lower maximized expected utility function. As such, the
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insured being risk-adverse should theoretically be willing to pay an amount equal to the
difference in expected utility for the insurer to observe their level of care. Logically, it follows,
as Shavell states, that the insured is willing to pay a lesser amount for the insurer

(0

obtain

imperfect information about their level of care. The insured's willingness to cover the additional
cost is equivalent to a person selling a chance to participate in a lottery for an amount equal to
the expected value of the lottery. We can think of the difference between the two utility
functions, which are lotteries in themselves, as a third lottery.
For the purpose of this analysis, this proposition suggests that the marine insurer can
incorporate inspections into policy requirements and transfer the monitoring cost on to the
insured. without destroying the incentive to purchase the insurance.

This still effectively

minimizes the moral hazard and adverse selection problems by allowing premium to be directly
affected by the level of care taken by the insured. Thus the economic costs of risky behavior are
internalized, and the tanker owner feels the burden himself.
As we have already stated. the primary goal of insurance is to provide compensation to
injured parties. This being the case, governments often impose limits on liability below the
expected losses from a given accident The aim of this is to ensure that victims receive at least
some compensation for their losses. Without imposed limits, it is difficult to insure against
unlimited losses, or even, as is the case with environmental liability insurance, against
astronomically high expected losses.

Governments often feel this defeats the purpose of

insurance policies.

TM Accident Problem l:rilh. UabWry and. Insurance
We must ask ourselves, how do imposed liability limits affect the level of care taken by the
insured and, as such, does this hun precautionary incentives?

The answer relies on the

forthcoming analysis. The following assumptions will be made for this case:
1) Strict liability holds.
2) The insured is risk-adverse, as determined by the Corollary (to Proposition 1).
3) The insured can affect the level of care.
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4) The insurer can observe the level of care taken by the insured. This is assumed
true for two reasons. First of all, as shown for the Corollary (to Proposition 4)
the insured has the incentive to pay extra to enable the insurer to monitor care
taken, as long as, monitoring costs are less than the difference between the
expected utility functions. As such, 1r = p(x)q. Secondly, ex-post monitoring is
automatic when observing the result of an accident.
The following definitions are added:

d = the magnitude of liability
g

= maximum government set liability limit.

1. lSog
As proven for Proposition 4, q = I assuming d = l , In other words, the insured will
purchase full coverage against losses if the magnitude of liability is equal to losses. As such, the
insured bears no risk. The level of care is chosen, as proven for Proposition 4, to minimize
p(x)/ + .r, the s urn of expected losses and the cost of care.

2. g<l 19
d = g, and the problem from above becomes:

maxEW
q

subject to

n=p(x)q

substituting g for I

Maximizing with respect to q yields the first-order condition:
EWq = [1- p(x)]W'(w- p(x)q- x)(-p(x») + p(x)W'(w - p(x)q- x + q - gXl- p(x)] = 0
And as expected:

q=g

EW reduces to:
EW = [1- p(x)]W(w- p(x)g -x)+ p(x)W(w- p(x)g - x)
And the problem becomes one of choosing x to minimize:

p(x)g +x
19 I imposed this restriction. This analysis does not appear in Shavell's text.
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If

If

15, g. then
g < 1, then

d

e

q» l.

d=g=q.

It can be said in the general case that:

d=q
Maximizing the expected utility function becomes a matter of:
minp(x)d+x

Furthermore, assuming that a given level of care, x , is taken by the insured the logical
conclusion holds that:
p(x)g + x < p(x)l + x
when g <I
Proposition: Assuming strict liability and that the insurer can observe the level of care taken by
the insured and that the insured is risk-adverse, the amount of coverage will equal the insured's
magnitude of liability. The maximization of the insured's expected utility function is a problem
of minimizing his expected losses plus the cost of care. The insured bears no risk of losses.
Furthermore, if the government set maximum liability is less than losses, the cost of care plus
expected losses is less under the set liability than with full losses.
Since the liability limit is less than the assessed damage, given a level of care, the sum of
expected losses and the cost of care is lower. So far the model has shown how premiums
affected by the level of care of the insured can minimize the problems of moral hazard and
adverse selection. However, we also asserted previously that cancellation provisions can also
reduce the problem of moral hazard. Is this, in fact, the case? To answer this question, it is
necessary to assume several restrictions upon the mode1.20 Assume the insured is risk-adverse
and able to affect the level of care. Assume further that the government has imposed a liability
limit and that the insured is strictly liable for damages. However, legislation also provides for
unlimited liability for cases of negligence.

The insurance policy includes a cancellation

provision for negligent cases. The insured now faces a situation with a negligence standard of
20 We will see later the these are indeed fair restrictions to make. They provide a highly accurate model of the
marine insurance industry.
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liability, no limit on liability and no insurance. An analysis of these two situations provides an
understanding of how this cancellation provision would affect the insured's level of care.

x· is defined as:
x· = the socially optimal level of care. 2 1
The first situation is identical to the model of The Accident Problem with Liability and

Insurance that has already been discussed. Shavell asserts that when d=/ , the insured, "will be
induced by the terms of their policies to choose x· ,"(Shavell 1987, p. 223). This can be stated

as:
x = x ••
We have already shown that when g < / , the insured has incentive to reduce his level of care.
Therefore, it must hold true in this case that:

< •
x-x.
To complete our comparison, we must

turn

to a model of the second situation.

T.h£. Accident Problem G.b=m Liability fJJ:ld tia Insurance
The following assumptions are being made for this section:
1) The insured is risk-adverse;
2) A negligence standard of liability is imposed;

3) The insured can effect the level of care taken;
4) d = 1. No government limit is set on liability, so liability is equal to
losses.
Assumptions hold for the same reasons as stated above.
j"

= the negligent standard of care.

Since for this case (ShaveU 1987, p. 222) the insured can be expected to choose the standard of
care, which protects him from being declared negligent:

x=x
21 For a discussion of the socially optimal level of care, please see Steven Shaven. Economic Analysis ofAccident

Law. For the purpose of this text

x·

is only included so as 10 provide a standard of refereoce.
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In this case, Shavell remarks that, "since V [the utility function of the injurer] is concave we
would expect the solution [the negligent standard of care] to exceed x· ," (Shavell1987, p. 222).
In this case, provided that the injurer is risk-adverse:
X should exceed x', 22

Therefore, since x =

x then x

should exceed x· .

Proposition: Taking into consideration the above assumptions, under a negligence standard the
injurer should increase his level of care as compared to his level of care when faced with strict
liability, insurance and a government limit on liability.
The threat of a cancellation clause coupled with a negligence standard motivates the
potential injurer to increase his level of care. Therefore, cancellation clauses can potentially
motivate precautionary incentives and minimize the problem of moral hazard. The complete
model answers one final question: Does the insured have the same incentives when faced with
losses that would result in his bankruptcy?

A Model ofBankruptcy and Liability
A declaration of bankruptcy protects a party from claims against it. "Consequently,
corporate reorganization and bankruptcy externalize some accident costs imposed by the firm's
activities," according to Cooter (1988, p. 448). Typically, a firm possesses an amount of
insurance above its total assets but far below potential liability.P This is a logical assumption,
because at a certain point the cost of insurance will equal the insured's wealth. At this point. it is
"better to run the risk of a suit than to use up all wealth to insure against it," (Cooter 1988, p.
448). Therefore, a fum will have an upper limit on its insurance coverage somewhere below the

point where its premium equals its wealth. It is in the firms interest to externalize any additional
liability through bankruptcy.

22 Shavell points out that it is possible for the solution to be .i < x·. For a discussiona proof of both results see p.
222of the text
23 This is especially true for environmental liability where claims are potentially enormous in size. It is not unheard
of rums facing billions of dollars of liability.
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The use of limited liability will theoretically expand the amount of insurance coverage
demanded by the insured, and thereby internalize a portion of the external costs (Cooter 1988, p.
450). Provided that the insured's upper limit of coverage is below the point where premiums
equal their wealth, the liability cap should be imposed just above the firms limit of insurance
coverage.e' This increases the probability that the insured will increase his coverage to a point
where it equals the liability limit. This strategy has a higher expected utility than facing
bankruptcy. The liability limit is effective, as long as, the insured's expected utility after
increasing his coverage is greater than before. The liability limit is also effective if only offered
in certain situations. Under these circumstances, the insured receives greater expected utility
from obeying the conditions of the liability limit than facing unlimited liability and bankruptcy.
Once again, the insured reaches a certain point when it is cost-effective to face unlimited liability
and risk bankruptcy. Losses that exceed liability limits are not compensated, but when an
organization declares bankruptcy, no losses are compensated. Unfortunately, liability limits are
rarely imposed specifically on an individual firm and often fail to take into account their
insurance limits. As such, they are sometimes relatively ineffective in internalizing these surplus
costs. Another solution to the problem lies in closing up the escape route in bankruptcy.
The means of accomplishing this is through legal measures. In achieving these goals, it is
important that bankruptcy laws still provide the debtor with temporary solace against claims, yet
do not provide him with the opportunity to shelter his assets from the liability. Two legal
remedies are available for achieving these goals. The first, "is to put more of the firm owner's
personal wealth in jeopardy in the event of a firm's bankruptcy," (Cooter 1988, p. 449). The
second method is that when reorganizing fmancially, after declaring bankruptcy, the entity
acquiring the assets of the original debtor also acquires the past and future claims (Cooter 1988,
p.449). This is known as the "successor doctrine" (Cooter 1988, p. 449). However, this also
means that no one will want to acquire the assets.
24 For a more complete discussionof the theory behind the implementation of liability caps see Cooter and Olen,
Law and Insurance. p. 448-50.
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These legal measures in theory preserve the compensatory and preventative aims of an
insurance contract by protecting against the threat of bankruptcy. The victims of loss are at least
still legally entitled to compensation for inflicted damages. Furthermore, the insured still has the
same incentives to increase his level of care, because he is unable to externalize the additional
costs. In reality, it is unlikely that all claims for environmental damages can be compensated in
many situations. However, the same precautionary incentives still exist, because the debtors
entire assets are still at risk. 25 This is not a realistic solution, because reforming the entire legal
structure of bankruptcy would be a nearly impossible task, The bankruptcy dilemma has no
simple solution.

Interaction of Regulation, Liability and Insurance
Although it is necessary to outline the background legislation, this thesis primarily
focuses on the role insurance can play and has played in preventing marine pollution from oil
without exacerbating the moral hazard and adverse selection dilemmas. Through the use of
inspections, premium incentives and underwriting clauses the insurance industry can control and
monitor statutory regulations by partially internalizing economic costs to ship and cargo owners
before an accident occurs. If the burden of payment and clean-up costs are borne directly by
owners and are not completely externalized to all policy holders within the insurance industry, an
increased incentive exists to maintain the highest safety standards and adhere to regulations. The
effectiveness of such control depends on both the industry'S ability to accurately assess risk,
predict liability, and maintain inspections and monitoring at a reasonable cost (Kehne 1986, p.

403). The combination of statutory regulations, tort law and insurance constraints can form a
highly effective reinforcing strategy.

25For a discussion of the bankruptcy laws as they have been interpreted in envirorunentallitigation see Jarred O.
Taylor II, "Cleaning Up The Dirty Nest: Who Pays For Environmental Cleanup? Issues of Concern to 'The General
Practitioner", Environmenlal Coverage: From Interpretation to Litigation, p, 57-76.
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This section applies the aforementioned concepts of moral hazard and adverse selection
directly to the marine insurance industry. I have attempted to show that the answers provided by
the model are indeed applicable to this real world situation. Furthermore, in order to justify the
analysis, it is also necessary to demonstrate that any modifications to the insurance system leaves
the insurer better off. This section looks at the general methods that the interaction of insurance
and legislation has in affecting the level of care taken within the marine oil shipping industry.
By doing so. in the next section, we are free to apply these concepts to specific problems of the

oil transport industry and discuss the necessary modifications to marine insurance contracts and
existing legislation.

Preventative Influences
The problem of moral hazard, as it applies to the maritime transport of oil, deals with the
incentives of the marine insurer to incur monitoring costs as a solution to minimizing the
dilemma. Furthermore, it looks at the effects of limited liability and negligence underwriting
clauses on the risk-incurring behavior of the insured.

Without the implementation of

underwriting clauses. inspections and care-based premiums, a pollution-liability contract actually
increases risk by reducing individual liability for insured ships involved in an accident when in
violation of legislative safety standards. If premiums are not affected by risk and contracts are
valid when the tanker is engaged in negligent actions, then the insurance will be most attractive
to firms posing the greatest risks and the problem of adverse selection is exacerbated. Logically,
this is not in the insurer's interest. With the use of premium incentives and contract provisions,
adverse selection is minimized. The contract enforces tile statutory standards on all ships with
third-party insurance. Self-insured tankers have the incentive to abide by the same regulations in
order to limit their maximum liability. Adverse selection occurs in favor of insured tankers if
contract provisions are not used in conjunction with the statutory regulations.
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Within the existing framework, legislation has the role of assigning liability for pollution
damages. It is necessary to set limits on liability. By setting a limit on an injurers' liability
below potential losses, in most situations innocent parties are assured of at least some
compensation for damages. If shipowners face unlimited liability in most situations, the costs of
operation become too high and they refuse to transport. When an accident does occur, the
shipping firm is often forced into bankruptcy and the victims don't receive any compensation.
However, appropriate legislation also has an obligation to promote safer practices and playa
precautionary role. This can be partially achieved by removing all caps on liability for damages
resulting from an institution that does not practice established safety standards and preventative
measures. In a situation of pure liability without insurance, these statutory regulations provide
the incentive to abide by set standards. A profit-maximizing firm will naturally adopt ail cost
justified precautions.

Insurance, covering all potential losses, can partially defeat the

precautionary measures. As we will see, the use of care based premiums and underwriting
clauses can offset the negative balance.
Liability only provides a precautionary incentive if a firm actually has the capital means
to pay the cost of damages. If a shipper does not have the financial assets to pay the liability,

their incentive to implement precautionary measures is diminished, because a declaration of
bankruptcy can externalize any economic costs above the limit of insurance. The marginal
benefit of taking additional precautions is reduced for a finn with limited assets. This means that
the profit-maximizing precautionary level will be lower for firms with fewer assets. By requiring
that firms demonstrate financial responsibility, legislation can confront the problem of under
capitalization. For firms with sufficient assets, self-insurance provides a realistic economic
possibility. However, the potentially concentrated costs from environmental pollution damages
may still encourage a finn to spread out these risks through some form of third-party insurance.
Its assets are large enough to ensure compensation for damages when liability is limited. Yet, I
will assert that the threat of bankruptcy. if the firms assets are still at risk, is sufficiently
unattractive to provide enough incentive to establish cost-effective precautionary and
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preventative practices, in order to limit liability based on legislative standards. Thus, for the self
insured, both the compensatory and preventative influences can be met.
Institutions without sufficient capital must necessarily tum to insurance as a means of
demonstrating financial responsibility. "Financial responsibility provisions require firms whose
activities involve risks of damages exceeding their net worth to maintain minimum levels of
insurance," (Kehne 1986, p. 403). The reality is that most firms possess some form of insurance,
either because of necessity or to distribute the risks.

In addition to solving the under

capitalization problem for these firms, insurance also has the ability to promote precautionary
behavior through exclusionary underwriting clauses and care-based premiums.
Care-based premiums are an avenue of influence. Through the use of mandatory
inspections, premiums can be directly linked to the level of care taken by the tanker. The method
internalizes the costs of not taking precautions. The cost of insurance is directly linked to the
level of care taken by the insured. A safety-conscious ship owner, like the example of the
fireman, pays a smaller premium for insurance coverage. While, on the other hand, less safety
conscious owners face higher premiums for identical coverage. Under this system, ship owners
are encouraged to take all cost-justified precautions to keep the costs of insurance down. Cost
justification implies that the additional costs of implementing the precautions are less than the
savings from a lower premium. This system has an additional benefit. By increasing the rate
structure so that taking fewer precautions has a greater affect on premiums, the insurer can
actually influence the desired level of safety standards met. The greater the difference in the
premium, when the precautions taken by the insured are reduced, the greater are the cost-justified
precautions.
Underwriting clauses also encourage tankers to comply with established precautions. The
clause nullifies the coverage for ships involved in an accident when not in compliance with
specific regulations. Failing to comply with regulations forces the owners to cover their own
risks. Self-insurance internalizes the economic costs of the accident and encourages owners to
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adopt all cost-justified safety standards. When used in conjunction with legislation, the effect
can be even stronger.

By also removing liability caps on vessels not in compliance with

regulations, the owner is faced with the additional burden of self-insuring himself against all
potential losses and risks. Unfortunately, this increases the risk of bankruptcy. Any costs greater
than the assets of the firm are externalized Therefore, when promoting safer practices through
the use of underwriting clauses, the precautions must still be cost effective. If the additional
costs over time are greater than the aggregate risks, the insurer will have a disincentive to
administer the additional precautions.

Fortunately, the monitoring costs are low for

implementing these clauses. The monitoring is almost entirely done ex-post, at the scene of an
accident These inspections will readily reveal any regulatory noncompliance. The additional
costs are negligible because in most situations ex-post monitoring already occurs.
Insurers still face the difficult decision of choosing when to use premium incentives
versus underwriting clauses.

As a general rule, risk-based premiums are preferred to

underwriting clauses. Underwriting clauses are a very powerful weapon of the insurer and for
many precautions can be toO severe. Like the old cliche, they can be compared to using a bomb
to kill a mouse. They also raise the risk of a shipping firm declaring bankruptcy and no money
being available to compensate the victims. Premium incentives account for the risks prior to an
accident and transfer the expected costs on to the insured. However, the shipowner still
possesses insurance which guarantees that money is available to compensate victims in the case
of an accident
The ability to monitor ex-ante or ex-post provides a means for deciding whether to use
risk-based premiums or underwriting clauses. If ex-ante (prior to an accident) monitoring is
possible, then the risks should be accounted for and incorporated into the premium structure. If
only ex-post monitoring is possible, then obviously the risk cannot be quantified and accounted
for in the insured's premium unless the premium is adjusted after an accident Underwriting
clauses must be used, because premium adjustments after a spill are not very effective due to the
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nature of oil transportation accidents. Since an accident often results in the loss of all assets. no
policy is needed after the fact If there is a new policy it will often be in the name of a new
corporation. !MO routing regulations are an excellent example of a case where only ex-post
monitoring is available. An insurer cannot determine if a ship will follow a traffic lane until after
an accident occurs. Those which choose to use approved traffic lanes will be covered; those
which don't will not be covered.
Once the appropriate combination of required demonstration of financial capability,
liability, regulation and insurance are achieved both the preventative and compensatory aims of
an insurance contract can be met and the moral hazard and adverse selection dilemmas resolved.
The suggested legislation and contractual standards provide a balance between both aims. In
most situations, the compensatory focus reduces the insured's maximum liability with the intent
of guaranteeing that an injured party receives some compensation.

However, the current

limitations of personal liability provide owners extensive protection from claims in excess of
liability limits (Mankabady 1980, p. 173), as is often the case with environmental pollution
damages. This reduces the number of precautions that the owner is justified by cost to take. The
use of care-based premiums and underwriting clauses promote the precautionary goals. These
suggestions maintain limited liability in most cases, guaranteeing compensation to injured
parties; yet, they prevent "gross negligence" and "willful misconduct" by placing no limitations
on liability for parties not in adherence with approved safety standards. The overall effect is to
reduce aggregate economic cost; the increased cost of care is offset by the reduction in losses.

Insurance Industry Incentive
The preceding section demonstrates that it is possible to design insurance contracts which
lower risk. However, it is not enough to demonstrate that the insurance industry has an effective
means of control. It must also be shown that it is in the best interest of the insurer and the
insurance industry to implement the above contractual regulations. A continual fear of insurers
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has been their inability to assess risk, liability and premiums in the pollution insurance market,
Failing to do SO limits the insurers ability to minimize their costs. The use of inspections can
limit insurers' losses by tying risky behavior directly to higher premiums. Contract provisions
also provide insurers with the incentive to limit their liability in cases of negligence and
misconduct

Minimizing the risk of an accident limits insurer's liability, which in tum

minimizes their costs.
Ross E. Cheit argues that while an insurer strives to minimize risks in theory, the
structure of the industry, in reality, diminishes their interest in safety (p. 29). For starters, the
industry relies on market segmentation, re-insurance and limited coverage policies to spread the
risks, which reduces an insurers interest in spill prevention (Cheit, p. 29-30). Funhermore, over
capacity in the industry (supply exceeds demand) induces insurers to lower premiums to gain a
greater market share. In such cases, they are unwilling to impose stricter safety standards for fear
that policy holders unwilling to bear the additional costs of implementing the standards will turn
to other insurers with more lenient regulations (Cheit, p. 35) .
In response to Cheit's first argument, I agree that spreading risk diminishes an insurer's
interest in safety, up to a certain degree. However, Cheit illustrates his argument with individual
examples. In the case of the Piper Alpha platform accident, $1.5 billion of liability was divided
into individual policies worth approximately $250,000 each (Cheit, p. 33).

$250,000 is

undoubtedly a minimal risk to a major insurer and provides little incentive to promote increased
safety standards. The answer lies in the aggregate. The insurer must be more concerned with the
additional liability he faces from all policies combined, as they are affected by a particular risk.
The overall effect of the increased risk on all policies is not negligible. Insurers still have an
incentive to increase their safety standards to minimize risks, as long as being safety conscious
does not cost them market share.
Insurers, being profit-maximizing businesses, have the incentive to offer their services at
the lowest cost possible. Lowering costs attracts a higher portion of the market share. Using
53

risk-based premiums and clauses enables the insurer to offer policies at the lowest possible
premium for the level of care taken by the insured Risk-based premiums lower premium costs
by encouraging safety practices and thereby reducing the number of claims on the insurer.
Underwriting clauses reduce the number and magnitude of wasteful claims, those that should
have been eliminated by regulation. Implementing additional safety standards comes at a greater
cost to the insured, encouraging a shipowner to seek an insurer that requires fewer safety
precautions. The insurer can only have a positive effect on reducing oil pollution if the
difference between the costs and benefits of the increased precautions is positive. In other
words. they must be cost-effective solutions. 26 The precaution must have a significant impact on
reducing the risk of pollution, if it is to be economically feasible. It must sufficiently lower the
insurer's liability, so that he can reduce the insured's premium enough that it outweighs the
additional cost of the safety measures. In such a way, this lowers the insured's overall costs,
increasing the insurer's market share and making them more competitive.
The oil shipping industry provides insurers with special opportunities to limit losses
through the use of inspections. Statutory regulations and financial constraints require that most
tanker owners turn to third-party insurers. It is in the interest of the insurer to lower its losses by
requiring inspections and including exclusionary clauses in contracts.

With underwriting

clauses, financial liability again fails with the insured in negligence cases. The insurer only bears
liability when the insured has taken all required precautionary measures.
Two problems of pollution-liability coverage arise when dealing with the maritime
transport of oil. In order to set risk-based premiums, an agency must be able to predict the
frequency of an event occurring and estimate the losses in such a case (Imbler 1986, p. 507).
Both are essential to pricing an insurance coverage. "In pollution coverage, these two essentials
are missing," states Imbler. With the combination of statistical data and the use of inspections,

26Thomas D. Hopkins presents an interesting study of the cost-effectivenessof double-hulls versus alternative hull
designsand operationand maintenance measures. The costs of these alternativesare compared with the economic
benefits associated with the resulting reductions in pollution. (Hopkins 1992,p. 59)
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marine insurance companies have a means of estimating premiums based on the care taken by
the individual policy holder.
The preceding sections have outlined the theoretical means of reducing pollution and
eliminating moral hazard and adverse selection with the use of insurance. The rest of this thesis
concentrates specifically on the marine insurance industry. It discusses the industry's ability to
affect the behavior of insured parties within the marine transport sector, thereby controlling
marine oil pollution. However, before discussing policy implications it is necessary to present an
overview of the nature and details of marine insurance contracts. V

Marine Insurance Contracts
Brent Dibner, vice-president of Mercer Management Consulting Inc., estimates that
ins urance comprises 4-7 % of the cost of operating a tanker (<eUnderwriters ..." 1992, p. A6). Oil
tankers usually carry from four to six separate insurance policies (Cheit, p. 12), falling into the
modem classifications of bull, cargo and protection and indemnity (P&I) insurance. It is useful
to divide these into the categories used by all commercial insurance: propeny and liability
(Hayden 1991, p. 314). As illustrated, the marine insurance market is one of purpose-specific
policies and highly segregated risks distributed throughout the global market. This has been
necessitated by the surmounting financial risks of maritime transport.
Unfortunately, modem business practices have resulted in policy packages that cross the
neat bounds of individual, specific insurance coverage. This has produced intricate arrangements
that are often unique to each policy holder and impede the use of standardized contractual forms.
Along with the archaic language of the industry, these convoluted policies produce extensive
coverage disputes that often end up within our court system. Such legal debates rarely deal with

The following sectionoffers only a verygeneral discussionof marine insurance. For a more detailed discussion
of the industrysee Haydenand Balick,"Marine Insurance: Varieties, Combinations, and Coverages," Tulane Law
Review. Arnauld, TIu! Law of Marine Insurance and Average and Ivamy, Marine Insurance are standard texts on
tbe industry and provide detailed information on the intricacies of marine insurancecontracts.
27
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specific coverage and are often concerned with issues affected by more than one policy.
However, the industry is not about to change soon, and it is useful to discuss marine insurance
policies in terms of the individual contracts.
Pollution liability insurance is the primary tool insurers have in limiting marine pollution
from spills and will be of primary concern to this thesis. It has become increasingly standard for

all tankers and is now required for tankers traveling in U.S. waters. An overview of hull, cargo
and P&I insurance are also discussed in this section, in that they are standard contracts of the
marine insurance industry and have certain control policy implications in themselves.P The
pollution exclusion clause in general liability insurance is also briefly considered to demonstrate
how an interesting conflict that arises in general policies can be eliminated by the specific nature
of pollution liability insurance.
Underwriters grade and classify premiums based on risk and maximum loss potential
(Mankabady 1980, p. 161). All values of indemnity are predetermined at the outset of the
contract (Lambeth 1981, p. 1) with liability distributed between separate tanker-owner and cargoowner policies (Mankabady 1980, p. 161).

Property Insurance
HuH Insurance
Hull insurance protects owners against loss of or damage to a vessel. This contract
covers damages to ''furnishings, life boats, and plant, as well as unowned equipment that may be
installed on the ship," (Hayden 1991, p. 315). Hull contracts usually rest with third-party,
independent underwriters. In the case of a collision, the contract may include coverage of the
other vessel where the insured is at fault (Hayden 1991, p. 316). Risks are specified in the
contract, and the policy also indemnifies against labor, salvage, and general average expenses
28 For a discussionof specific clauses (i,e, war risk) that are Dot of principle interest to the control of pollution, see
Hayden, 1991.
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(Hayden 1991, p. 316). Three standard contract forms are currently in use: Lloyd's, non
Lloyd's London market, and the American insurance market The Lloyd' s is the most common,
but the American Institute Hull Clauses (A.LH.C.) is the most important in the U.S. market.
An important consideration in hull contracts is the Inchmaree Clause (or Additional Perils

Clause). It extends coverage to losses resulting from negligence of the crew or latent defect in
the hull and machinery. The clause provides owners with protection against claims made against
accidents resulting from sub-standard crew performance and ship construction. Owners have the
potential to use the clause as protection against losses resulting from cost cutting practices in the
form of less stringent crew and construction standards. Placing restrictions on the clause has the
potential to eliminate this loop-hole.
The Running Down Clause, included in hull contracts, provides protection against limited
third party damages from collision liability. The clause is traditionally limited to a fraction
(usually 75%) of the total claims, in order to provide an incentive for safe navigation practices
(Hayden 1991, p. 318). Significant exclusions apply including pollution liability.

Cargo Insurance
In simple terms, cargo insurance provides cargo owners with protection against loss or
damage to their freight. It is traditionally offered at low cost and can be obtained with relative
ease (Hayden 1991, p. 319). The contracts exist with independent underwriters. The contract
primarily defines three conditions: The perils insured against; the duration of the coverage; and
the financial extent Specific policies called "all risk" coverage insure against a wider range of
perils than traditionally covered in cargo insurance contracts. It is important to Dote that the
duration of coverage. in most cases, lasts from [he time the cargo is loaded onto the ship until
unloading. The three standardized forms exist for cargo clauses, but in use usually include
extensive modifications and amendment (Hayden 1991, p. 324).

57

Liability Insurance

Protection and Indemnity Insurance
Protection and indemnity (P&I) insurance protects against shipowner, third party and
contractual liabilities (Hayden 1991, p. 326). It fills a unique niche in the marine insurance
market by providing coverage not usually obtainable in other policies. The insured is covered
against liabilities arising from the operation of the "enrolled ship", whether it be owned, operated
or chartered (Hayden 1991, p. 327). Coverage may include, among other things, personal injury
claims, passenger liability, collision, wreck removal, towage, and pollution (Hayden 1991, p.
327). The contracts generally do not insure against property loss, providing primarily only

liability insurance.
P&I policies are often held with P&I clubs. P&l clubs are groups of ship owners who
pool liability against individual loss (Abecassis 1976, p. 45). The clubs have a unique method of
operation within the insurance industry. Policies are not usually issued, but rather the insured is
accepted into the club as a "member". A ship is issued with a certificate of membership, and the
terms of the "policy" are detailed in the association's "Rules" (Hayden 1991, p. 326). To
complicate the issue further, clubs pay on an indemnification basis. The member must pay the
obligation, and the club is in turn liable to pay the member (Hayden 1991, p. 336-7). The
directors also have latitude in deciding which claims should be paid (Hayden 1991, p. 337).
P&I coverage contains significant exclusion clauses that limit their liability for claims
resulting from circumstances, such as breach of contract or terminated voyages. Of particular
interest, the policy excludes against liability normally covered in hull contracts, regardless of
whether the member possesses hull insurance (Hayden 1991, p. 328).
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Pollution Liability Insurance
While standard pollution liability insurance is available from only a handful of
organizations worldwide, marine pollution liability insurance for both tanker and cargo owners
of the international fleet of approximately 4,000 tankers is available from many domestic and
foreign firms (Zagaski 1992, p. 155). However minimal, coverages for oil tankers have
traditionally been available and at reasonable costs (Zagaski 1992, p. 155). Several conditions
have helped to keep costs to a non-prohibitive level. First of all, although legislation in the past
has held owners and operators liable for cleanup costs and damages to natural resources, it did
not impose any liability for third party injuries or property damages. Adding to this, since spills
tend to be short term occurrences, the clean-up costs are often reasonable (Zagaski 1992, p. 155).
However, legislation and spills have helped to alter the course of pollution liability
insurance. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, as stated above, has a more comprehensive definition
of compensable damages. In addition to clean-up costs and natural resource damages, an
owner/operator is responsible for damages to real or personal property, subsistence use,
revenues, and profit and earning capacity. Furthermore, recent accidents have resulted in larger
costs. The wreck of the Exxon Valdez in Prince William Sound, Alaska has already left
responsible parties liable for well over one billion dollars in damages. With liability increasing,
the insurance industry has seen an increase in both the magnitude of coverage and the number
seeking coverage. 87% of ship owners and operators use insurance to demonstrate financial
responsibility, and 62% hold their policies with London-based insurers (Zagaski 1992, p. 156).
The U.S. Coast Guard statistics show that only about 15 vessels/year are stopped for not meeting
liability requirements (Zagaski 1992, p. 157) Furthermore, since 1973, only two spills have
occurred involving ships without proper coverage (Zagaski 1992, p. 157).
Pollution liability coverage is usually included with P&I cover, although in some cases it
is excluded from the agreement and treated as a separate policy. Essentially, members then
purchase pollution coverage by buying the coverage back into the P&I policy. According to
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John B. Gallagher. vice-president of Frank B. Hall & Company, the American claims
representatives for the Norwegian company, Assuranceforeningen Gard, the standard pollution
policy is $500 million although some ships carry an additional $200 million (Wald 1990b, p.
AI9). The basic $500 million limit is obtained at considerable prices (Hayden 1991, p. 336).
Premiums are based on the factors of risk, with a premium surcharge levied on vessels that
transport "persistent oil" to the U.S. The surcharge was adapted because of the increased
liability limits set by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. If a declaration of the premium is not
provided, an exclusion clause automatically applies. It is estimated that the industry. including
special risk organizations discussed below. at the end of 1990, could capably deal with pollution
risks of approximately $1.3 to 1.6 billion (Hayden 1991, p. 336).
The Tanker Owners' Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution
(TOVALOP) also protects against losses by assisting with the recovery of spill costs
(Mankabady 1980, p. 163). This tanker industry agreement is limited to clean up costs and
excludes third party claims (Hayden 1991, p. 335). Furthermore, the Contract Regarding an
Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution (CRISTAL) aids in compensating third

party damage from pollution and covering clean-up costs. CRISTAL is not available to the
majority of tanker owners but is intended to benefit cargo owners and the oil industry. The
contract provides third-party compensation not received from tanker owners due to their
successful limitation of liability (Hayden 1991, p. 335). All claims are paid by members
subscriptions and the earnings from such (Mankabady 1980, p. 163). CRISTAL developed from
tanker-owners' demand that the oil industry share in the pollution burden (Mankabady 1980, p.
163). With ever increasing pollution damage's claims and liability, the two agreements still only
provide limited protection and financial compensation.
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Comprehensive General Liability Insurance and the Pollution Exclusion Clause
The comprehensive general liability (CGL) policy was drafted by the Insurance Services
Office, Inc. in 1940; primary users include many of the largest U.S. underwriters. Throughout its
history, it has been continually redrafted and currently exists as the "commercial general liability
program" (Hayden 1991, p. 339). The designation "comprehensive" only indicates that the
policy does not contain automobile insurance. In fact, it can be wide ranging in extent,
combining an array of established liability coverage into a single document (Hayden 1991, p.
339). The COL traditionally makes use of extensive exclusion clauses. While not a form of
marine insurance, the wide-reaching activities of corporations have led to the involvement of the
CGL in litigation over maritime claims (Hayden 1991, p. 339). Many of the maritime disputes
have been over the interpretation of exclusion clauses. While not directly involved in the
litigation over maritime concerns, the pollution exclusion clause in most general liability
contracts has proven to be ambiguous, and potentially instructive.
As Lathrop interprets it, "The 1970 pollution exclusion clause adopted by most American
insurers bars coverage for damages attributable to the release of hazardous substances except
when the release is •sudden and accidental' ," (1992, p. Iiv).

The intent of the clause is to limit

insurers' liability for intentional long-term damage from the willful misconduct of the insured.
Insurers were in effect trying to eliminate their responsibility for normal damages. However, the
interpretation on the term 'sudden and accidental" has resulted in a rash of litigation that at its
extremes has swung in favor of either party, depending on the case. In some instances, it has
been held that even if the discharge or release is intentional, coverage cannot be withheld if the
pollution damages are unforeseen (Lathrop 1992, p. Iv). The effect was that insurers were forced
to pay claims on incidents not reflected in policy premium structure. Since 1985, insurers have
clarified the clause resulting in an absolute pollution exclusion. Recent litigation pertaining to
policies with the old exclusion clause has turned in favor of the insurers.

61

In 1989, a New Jersey judge ruled in favor of insurers against the Diamond Shamrock
Chemicals Company. The court said they were not liable for the bill, possibly in excess of $20
million, that resulted from injuries from dioxin, a toxic byproduct of Agent Orange (Labaton
1989, p. D2). During the same year, Shell lost a major case resulting in their personal liability
for the cost of injuries and clean-up from a site used to manufacture toxic pesticides. The cost
could exceed $1.8 billion (Labaton 1989, p. D2).
The experience in the U.S. insurance market demonstrates the danger of including
pollution coverage in a general liability policy. Pollution insurance is best maintained as a
separate policy or well worded clause. The pollution exclusion clause, however ambiguous as it
has been, could prove to be a useful model for exclusionary clauses in marine pollution liability
contracts. Exclusionary clauses would serve a similar purpose in limiting insurers losses
resulting from the negligent actions or willful misconduct of the insured It also reveals the
necessity of careful wording in defining the terms 'willful misconduct' and 'negligence'.

The Structure of the Industry
Marine insurance exists within the broader range of the general insurance market. It is
often only pan of a company's larger comprehensive insurance package. This inter-relationship,
along with the complexity of marine insurance contracts themselves, often leads to maritime
coverage disputes where the courts have difficulty assigning liability to a particular underwriter.
Three issues require clarification. First, does an individual policy protect against the claim?
Second, have the policies been layered with excess coverage? Finally, has the underwriter
purchased reinsurance? The first issue is self explanatory, but a brief discussion of excess
policies and reinsurance is necessary.
Excess policies exist between the assured and their original underwriter. They insure
against a risk, usually under the same terms as the original policy, for an amount in excess of the
initial coverage. According to the decision of Cargill, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., excess
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coverage goes into effect when the liability limit of the "primary coverage has been exhausted,"
(889 F.2d 174, 179, 1990 AMC 434, 437). The issue becomes more complicated when primary
and excess contracts are multi-layered with other policies, such as umbrella coverage.
On the other hand, reinsurance is a contract entered into between more than one
underwriter. According to Hayden, "In essence, reinsurance is insurance purchased by the
original underwriter from another underwriter," (1991, p. 354). It is an effort to distribute the
risks. Like P&I contracts, reinsurance is an indemnity contract (Hayden 1991, p. 355). The
secondary underwriter is not constituted to pay part of an initial claim but to reimburse the
primary underwriter after the claim has been settled The practice of reinsurance has another
benefit to underwriters. It enables them to issue policies in excess of their financial limits, in
effect leveraging the finn.
As has been often stated, the multi-layers and different types of insurance cause
numerous discrepancies. Three clauses are often enacted in contracts that enable the courts to
reduce the confusion: Escape, excess, and pro rata (Hayden 1991, p. 356). An escape clause
nullifies a policy to a loss when other coverage exists. An excess clause covers items outside of
other policies (Hayden 1991, p. 357). Pro rata terms require two policies to share a portion of the
loss, based on their limits of liability. The Doctrine of Mutual Repugnance, enacted by the
courts, provides further clarification of the disputes. It declares that when two policies have
enacted excess clauses, they will share the financial responsibility on a pro rata basis (Hayden
1991, p. 359).

Two Case Examples
It is useful to look at several cases where insurance became a complicated legal issue
after a spill. This helps to present a better understanding of the intricate nature of marine
insurance coverage and the difficulty courts have had interpreting policy wording. As an
example of pollution coverage, the company Arco Marine typically carries $1.25 billion of

63

pollution liability insurance per ship, an amount far greater than the standard policy. Both the
Mega Borg and the Braer, which were involved in highly publicized accidents during the last

several years, carried $700 million in pollution liability insurance and provide excellent
examples of the discussed problem.
The Mega Borg is primarily owned by K.S. Mega Borg II but is managed by part-owner
A.S. Mosvolds Rederi (Wald 1990b, p. A19). Registered in its country of origin (Norway), its
$700 million of pollution insurance is through the company known as Gard of Arenda, Norway
(Wald 1990b, p. A19). Gard readily made the insurance available for cleanup and damage
claims at the time of the accident. The owners also carry approximately $20 million of insurance
on the ship (Wald 1990b, p. AI9). In this case, the complication comes in the nature of the
pollution liability contract. Gard is a mutual insurance company, which means it is owned by the
investors that it insures. However, part of the pollution policy on the Mega Borg is owned by
other companies, which bought portions of the claim from Gard (a standard practice in the
marine insurance industry) (Wald 1990b, p. A19). The reinsurers consist of mutual maritime
insurance companies, as well as commercial insurance firms.
The wreck of the Liberian registered Braer off of the coast of the Shetland Islands
presents an interesting confusion in its own right when it comes to pollution liability. The facts
clearly show that the ship was owned by Bergval & Hudner Ship Management of Stanford,
Connecticut The vessel is insured for $12.7 million of which $4 million of the insurance is with
Lloyd's of London (Jenkins 1993a, p. 1). Its cargo, consisting of 26 million gallons of light
crude, was owned by Ultramar Corp. of Tarrytown, NY (Wells 1993d, p. A3). The cargo had an
estimated $11 million value, and Ultramar reported they had sufficient insurance to cover the
value of the cargo (Wells 1993d, p. A3). However, the confusion arises in who is held liable for
pollution damages. The New York Times reports that Bergval & Hudner had $700 million of
pollution liability insurance (Stevenson 1993a, p. A6). Michael Budner, CEO of the fum, stated
that this money would be available for the cleanup and damages from the spill.

64

The London

Times contradicted this stating that since under international agreements the polluter pays for
damages, Ultramar is responsible for the bill having chartered the vessel from B&H (Jenkins

1993a, p. 1). Ultramar in turn carries $500 million in insurance through the Skuld Club in Oslo
(Jenkins 1993a, p. 1).
These examples illustrate the difficulty in assigning responsibility for damages. In some
cases, both cargo and tanker owners are potentially liable for third-party and pollution damages.
Combined with the complex and inter-related nature of marine insurance policies, it becomes
complicated to determine which policy covers the appropriate claims. In certain instances. more
than one coverage may insure against a risk, such as. pollution or cargo liability. The result has
been that in many cases the courts are left with the decision of assigning responsibility.

ru Control Policy Framework; E.otus.Qll Insurance
The content of this thesis up until this point has been concerned with the theoretical
means by which insurance can influence precautionary practices in the maritime transport of oil.
The culmination was a model of the interrelationships among insurance, liability and legislation.
Conclusions from that model have suggested ways in which insurance can promote increased
safety standards, specifically in the use of care-based premiums and underwriting clauses. The
rest of the thesis deals with the application of these principles and how they can be used to
mitigate oil spills within the marine shipping industry. In doing so, I incorporate the preceding
section, which discusses the details of the marine insurance industry. Specifically, I show how
marine insurance can act to control oil spills, not only within the existing framework. but also by
serving as a catalyst for reforming the regulatory structure. The conclusion of this section
discusses an application of the principles to a specific theoretical example.
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Marine Insurance as a Control Policy
Abecassis relates that "Accidental pollution from tankers is caused by the incompetence
of officers and crew manning them. This is exacerbated. by very high traffic densities in some
areas ...." (1976. p. 26). Such a statement highlights the need for increased personnel standards,
enforced routing systems and better hull and equipment standards. Premium incentives and
contract provisions can have an effect in reducing pollution caused by the maritime transport of
oil. On average, tanker owners, in attempts to cut costs in response to increasing economic
pressures, are adhering to less stringent training and safety standards (Schmidt

1993~ p.

A 14).

A ship involved in a spill may be under capitalized and unable to financially meet their
liability requirements. Financial responsibility, as defmed by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,
confronts the under-capitalization problem by requiring that a ship's owner have the assets to
cover the maximum costs they would be liable for in the case of an oil spill. Since Federal
liability is limited by law to a maximum of $10,000,000, self-insurance provides an economic
possibility to firms whose assets are large enough to cover these costs. For institutions with
smaller capital assets, an accident might threaten the firm with bankruptcy. Thus, smaller
operations have the financial incentive to purchase insurance if it were offered in order to
minimize the direct liability of their capital assets. However, larger firms are often still faced
with the unlimited liability imposed by states and still have many of the same incentives to
purchase insurance in order to minimize the risk on their assets. Due to the simple fact that
insurance spreads risks over time, most large firms still purchase some form of insurance.
I propose that for greatest effectiveness. the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 should be modified
to define "gross negligence" and "willful misconduct" as they apply to oil pollution liability to
include any ship not meeting certain outlined safety and construction standards or following
established traffic routing and separation schemes. Then, in accordance with Sect 1004 (c) of
the Oil Pollution Act. any ship not exercising due care as it applies to the above proposals is
excluded from any limitations on their liability and becomes responsible for all damages and
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cleanup costs associated with an accident. In a situation of pure liability (i.e. without insurance),
statutory regulations provide the incentive to abide by improved personnel, hull construction and
routing standards when the economic risk of an accident outweighs the costs of improving
standards.
Insurance adds an additional variable to the equation. 87% of all vessel owners and
operators carry some form of third-party or mutual association insurance, even though larger
firms have the financial freedom to self-insure if they so choose (Zagaski 1992, p. 156).29
Owners with less capital are required to purchase insurance to either meet financial responsibility
requirements or at the very least protect the bulk of their assets. Insurance now plays the
operative role in pollution prevention. It is an effective role in that marine insurance can limit oil
pollution through the use of care-based premiums and underwriting clauses.

Premium Incentives
The use of care-based premiums can effectively enforce stricter hull, equipment and
construction standards, as well as tighter crew training. Both are relatively easy and cost
effective in that monitoring of both situations is a relatively simple task. A great deal of
imperfect information is already available to the insurance industry. Organizations such as
Lloyd's Register maintain detailed information on all tankers. This provides immediate
information when determining premiums on tanker construction standards. However, to ensure
that the standards are maintained over time, periodic inspections are necessary. H canied out by
the insurance industry or an independent third-party operator, the increased cost to the insurance
industry will be transferred to the insured. Theoretically, as presented in Shaven's model, this is
still to the benefit of the insured as long as the increase in cost is compensated for by a greater
decrease in premiums since the insurer faces lower claims.

However, strict financial

responsibility as defined by the Oil Pollution Act requires that most tankers possess insurance.
29According to the U.S.General Accounting OfficeReport to Congress. January, 1988. only 11 % of vesselowners
and operators relyon self-insurance (Zagaski 1992. p. 156).
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The insured in this situation is still forced to willingly or unwillingly bear the increased costs.
Premium incentives can be incorporated into virtually all forms of marine insurance contracts.
Contract Provisions

Underwriting clauses have the ability to impose insurance sanctions on tankers not
meeting prescribed safety regulations. This forces tanker owners to weigh the costs of taking the
safety precaunoas versus the cost of taking fewer precautions and facing full liability for all costs

occurring from a probable accident. Their greatest effectiveness is in enforcing adherence to
established routing systems and restricted areas where ex-post monitoring is necessary.
However, they can also playa potential role in enforcing minimum crew and equipment
standards. With legislation imposing unlimited liability on a tanker not in compliance with
established minimum standards, the additional threat of having to pay all costs personally
imposes an even more significant economic threat. This forces tanker owners and operators to
adhere to stricter safety standards and eliminate cost cutting routes . The enforced standard must
still be cost-effective. If the increased costs outweigh the additional risks, the shipowner will
still not be inclined to take the extra precautions. The International Maritime Organization has
documented the effectiveness of routing systems and areas to be avoided in reducing marine
pollution. The United States Congress has initiated a funher study in the same area (OPA, Sec.
4107). Contract provisions, enforcing crew and equipment standards, can be incorporated into
hull or pollution liability contracts. Underwriting clauses, effecting IMO routing regulation,
should be written into pollution liability contracts. Since pollution liability contracts are policies
of indemnification, even the threat of unlimited liability alone is a tremendous risk to the insurer.
The insured is still faced with the responsibility of covering the costs of all damages before being
compensated by the P&I Club.
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Hull, Equipment and Construction Standards
The design and construction of a tanker has been shown to affect the amount of oil lost at
sea from both operational and accidental pollution (Abecassis 1976, p. 47) . Segregated ballast
tanks and slop tanks reduce the amounts of oil discarded during operational procedures, but

moreover, along with double hulls, they can reduce losses in the event of an accident. In
addition, improved equipment and maintenance standards can have a positive influence on
reducing the risk of an accident occurring.
One ongoing argument concerns the necessity of double-hulls. Popular and government
opinion in recent years supports their use. The argument for them is that the supertankers of
today have an extremely low ratio of steel to oil which makes the ship highly vulnerable to
gashing and rupturing in the result of a collision.

The International Convention for the

Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 discussed the mandatory use of double skins or
bottoms on ships (Timagenis 1980, p. 437). While the Convention did not set a precedent on the
matter, the United States led the delegates supporting the use of double hulls (Timagenis 1980, p.
437). The United States OPA has lead the way by requiring all new tankers operating in U.S.
waters to be equipped with double-hulls (Title N, Subtitle A). The IMO has agreed with these
precautions and also required all new tankers built after 1993 to have double-hulls (uThe
Wreck. .." 1993, p. 49). It is amazing that while almost all of the world's merchant fleet has
double-hulls (Zagaski 1992, p. 145), only about 530 of the 3200 tankers in the world fleet are
equipped with them (Zagaski 1992, p. 153). With increasing government legislation requiring
their use, within approximately 20 years most ships will be equipped with double-hulls . My
assumption is that few new ships are being built today that are not

SO equipped.

The insurance

industry's greatest weapon lies in the use of significantly higher premiums on single-hull tankers,
premiums which internalize the cost associated with the higher expected damages. These
premiums can have a tremendous effect on getting older ships to refit with double-hulls. In this
case, insurance can playa strong role in supporting the existing legislation. Insurance can also

69

be effective in supporting an alternative suggestion that single-hull tankers be required to use a

tug in port areas (Sankovitch 1993, p. 43). A Norwegian registry has recently introduced an
«Environmental Class", which requires double-bottom hulls and various other safety features on

ships (Sankoviteh 1993, p. 20-1).
The Convention set a strong precedent on the use of segregated ballast tanks and oil
retention systems. They found that prohibiting discharges is only effective if used in conjunction
with design and construction improvements (Timagenis 1980, p. 430). The following legislation

arose from the Convention. All tankers carrying in excess of 70,000 tons are required to
maintain segregated ballast containers and two slop tanks (Timagenis 1980, p. 392). Tankers
carrying over 150 tons gross must separate oil and ballast tanks but are not mandated to maintain
segregated tanks (Timagenis 1980, p. 392-3). Furthermore, any ship over 400 tons gross when
fitted must possess a slop tank, filtering equipment and a discharge monitoring system if carrying

oil; new ships require systems enabling discharge to on-shore reception facilities (Timagenis
1980, p. 389). MARPOL also set requirements on separating ballast containers (Dowling, p. 6).
The segregation of cargo and ballast tanks also serves to reduce potentiaJ loss in the case of an
accident by reducing the percentage of the vessel containing oil or oily-water mixture (Timagenis
1980, p. 431). The effectiveness of slop systems depends on the availability of on-shore
reception facilities, which unfortunately tanker insurance has little control over.

Contract

provisions can ensure the initial compliance with the 1973 and future standards. With industry
sponsored inspections and the threat of sanctions, segregation can be monitored and maintained.
The shipping industry still needs to improve equipment and inspection standards to
improve the safety of ships. The Marine Directorate suggests the use of better data displays to
aid the crew in information assimilation and navigation (1991, p. 17). The!MO is calling for
more rigorous and frequent inspections of ships ('''The Wreck..." 1993, p. 49). In addition, the
Paris Club of European Coastal Nations is considering mandatory inspections on all ships
entering their ports (Prynn 1993b, p. 2). As an example for the need of inspections, corrosion
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causes a ship to lose 2% of its steel per year (Cheit, p. 10). To detect this corrosion requires
frequent and detailed inspections, because the corrosion can be sporadic and difficult to detect
(Cheit, p. 10). Insurance can playa possible role in enforcing these inspections through the use
of underwriting clauses. The industry can also encourage higher equipment standards, like
design and construction standards, with risk-based prerniwn incentives.

Personnel Standards

Officers and crew operating on board tankers must be sufficiently trained (Abecassis
1976, p. 41). The Marine Directorate has concluded that training needs to focus more on
developing good judgment (1991, p. 25). Many accidents develop from incompetence due to a
lack of practiced skill. Radar misinterpretation is still common, and fatigued crews are often
blamed as the cause of human errors in shipping accidents (Marine 1991, p.17). As such, greater
time at sea under experienced supervision is required (Marine 1991, p. 26), and sufficient crew
sizes are necessary to ensure that people are not operating a ship under fatigued conditions.
Furthermore, since pilots are ultimately responsible for the safety and navigation of their ship,
greater oversight of their activities must be implemented (Sankovitch 1993, p. 43). Of the
casualties which involved sufficient information to reach a judgment, 90% of all collisions and
groundings and 15% of aU contacts and explosions were found to be partly caused by human
error (Marine 1991, p. 2). The groundings of the Exxon Valdez, Torrey Canyon, and Amoco
Cadiz were all blamed on crew error (Cheit, p. 10).

Unfortunately, crew training and safety standards fall under the jurisdiction of a ship's
flag state (Abecassis 1976, p. 41). This logically leads to variations in standards. As stated by
an analyst for a New York-based brokerage house, "If you're a Greek, you can have a
Panamanian registration and have Taiwanese or Indian crewmen, and your crew size can be
substantially smaller. If you're a U.S. corporation, it's a lot trickier to have foreign registry and
foreign crews," (Wald 1990a, p. A27). The use of mixed crews is another issue of concern,
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because in an emergency situation people have the tendency to revert to their native tongues
(Jenkins 1993b, p. 2). This raises the issue of possibly enforcing stricter requirements on using
English as an intemationallanguage of shipping.
For the insurance industry to have effective control, internationally agreed. upon standards
of training must be set (Abecassis 1976, p. 44), either by the insurers themselves or through
international treaties.

One possibility is the use of the training standards outlined by the

MARPOL convention. With such international agreements, the industry through the use of
contractual provisions and sanctions have the tools necessary to enforce minimum crew training
standards.

Then through the use of risk-based premiums, higher crew standards can be

encouraged However, to maintain long-term influence increased inspections are necessary. The
Directorate suggests on-board reponing independent of company personnel (Marine 1991, p. 24).

In order to provide the necessary incentive to increase crew standards, the cost of inspections and
additional training must be less than the reduction in premium received by the tanker owner.

IMO Areas to Be A voided and Routing Regulations
The following of predetermined routes by mariners first originated in 1898 (IMC()3o
1971, p. 4). Along with "areas to be avoided" recommendations, routing systems provide an
interesting area of study. Their use and enforcement can have one of the strongest effects on the
reduction of pollution at sea (Abecassis 1976, p. 37).

"IMeO is recognized as the only

international body responsible for establishing and recommending measures on an international
level concerning routing and areas to be avoided by ships or cenain classes of ships" (!Mea
1971, p. 6). Unfortunately, as a UN member !MeO only has the ability to recommend adherence
and "invites" governments to enforce these regulations and restrictions (!MeO 1971, p. 5). To
this extent, governments have only influenced. their use as opposed to requiring it (Abecassis

30 The International MaritimeOrganization (IMO) used to be called the Inter-Governmental MaritimeConsultative
Organization (IMCO).
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1976, p. 37). Through the use of sanctions, the insurance industry has the ability to control stricr
adherence to IMCO principles.
Areas to be avoided are established due to insufficient aids to navigation or to prevent
damage to wildlife of unacceptable consequences "which may result from a casualty" (lMCa
1971, p. 6). Tankers often use such areas as convenient or time saving measures. Although, the
ability to cut time and distance off of a journey can save money and increase profits, this shortcut
raises the likelihood of environmental disaster. Using !MCa statutory regulations to restrict
areas, underwriters can enforce the ban by excluding any claims arising from accidents in these
zones. The restriction immediately establishes fault on the wayward vessel. The economic cost
of traveling in restricted regions becomes unacceptable for tanker and cargo owners. The
criticism of this policy is that it focuses strictly as preventive insurance as opposed to
compensatory. Sometimes such strict measures are required.
As an example, !MCa bas established an area of a seven mile radius centered at 46°10'.0
N., 2026'.0 W. on the Rochebonne Shelf to be avoided by "tankers carrying oil" because "local
knowledge is considered essential for safe passage" (Figure 2) (!MCO 1971. p. 44). This area
has been established to avoid the risk of pollution from an accident. The British Department of
Trade mentions several areas such as Chichester and Langstone Harbor, Portsmouth Harbor, and
Bembridge Ledges, Isle of Wight as fragile environmental zones providing important ecosystems
for a diverse number of species O'aJl?enbeck Incident 1971, p. 24-25).
"The increase in traffic density, combined with the use of ships of greater tonnage and
higber speed, indicated. that the wider application of the principle of traffic separation, whenever

it warranted. could contribute substantially to safety at sea by reducing the number of ships
meeting on opposite or nearly opposite courses and by providing an orderly flow of traffic"
(IMCO 1971, p. 4). In fact, U.S. imports of oil are increasing since we have failed to implement
conservation measures (Sankovitch 1993, p. 42). The State of Louisiana has estimated that
tanker traffic in the Gulf of Mexico will double by the year 2007 (Sankoviteh 1993. p. 42).
73

Figure 2 - Rochebonne Shelf
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IMca

has developed, adopted and applied extensive schemes throughout the world (!MCa

1971, p. 4). Five general principles were developed for the use of routing and separation
schemes:
1. To be used in all ice free weather day and night;
2. To be used by all ships;
3. Shallow draught vessels should avoid deep draught lanes;
4. Ships not using lanes should avoid them;
5. Inshore zones are established for coastal traffic
(lMCO 1971, p. 10).
As far back as 1960, routing practices were recognized to reduce the risk of collisions between
ships and with icebergs (Abecassis 1976, p. 37). With traffic lanes in use, navigation against
established lanes exposes vessels to unreasonable risk (!MOO 1971. p. 5).
Although national governments are responsible for enforcing these routing practices, they
have failed to do so. Here again, insurance sanctions have tremendous potential to enforce the
usage of routing and traffic separation schemes.

Fault is easily established with the ship

traveling in opposition or disregard for appropriate schemes.

Contract clauses inflicting

sanctions on vessels involved in an accident while in disregard for a traffic scheme serve as
strong preventive medicine. The economic risk becomes too high. Just as we would not drive on
the wrong side of the road. it is necessary to establish lanes in high traffic waterways.
The Strait of Dover provides an excellent example of the need for and use of traffic
schemes (Figure 3). The Institutes of Navigation of the

UK.

France and West Germany first

conducted a study on traffic separation in the Strait in 1961 (IM:CO 1971, p. 4). As of 1976, up
to 300,00 ships per year passed through the Strait of Dover and as many as 20 in each direction
at anyone time (Abecassis 1976, p. 18). The need. for routing and traffic separation is clear.

IMCD separated the lanes by natural obstacles existing in the middle parts of the Strait (1971, p.
31). Northeast traffic is recommended to travel near the French coast, outside the inshore traffic
zone, and travel in the opposite direction to proceed off the English coast (lMCO 1971, p. 31).
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Blatant disregard for the schemes persist nonetheless (Abecassis 1976, p. 39).
efficient outcome is clear, another means of enforcement is necessary

[0

While the

assure that outcome.

Insurance can provide that means.

Figure 3 - The Strait of Dover
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Figure 4 - New York (lMCO 1971, p. 71)
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New York· An Application of Marine Insurance as a Control Policy
This section attempts to illustrate how the principles discussed in the preceding sections
can be applied to act as a method of pollution prevention. The purpose is to show that all of the
recommendations are not necessarily applicable in every situation but that the means of control is
still effective. I have chosen to use the area around New York Harbor as a case example. New
York is one of the busiest ports in the world and sees a large volume of tanker traffic daily. The
area known as New York Harbor begins roughly around Ambrose Light (Figure 4)31 and
encompasses the ports around Manhattan, including Long Island, New Jersey and Staten Island.
The larger ships, including the giant supertankers, take three principal approaches from the
Atlantic - eastern) southeastern and southern. The eastern approach roughly follows the south
shore of Long Island, and likewise the southern follows the east coast of New Jersey. The
southeastern approach falls at roughly a 4Y angle between the other two.
I am assuming. for the purpose of this example that four requirements or preferences have
been deemed necessary or desirable for the safe transport of tankers to and from New York
Harbor.'?
1. All ships must have a pilot on board familiar with New York Harbor and who

is accustomed to the heavy and congested traffic conditions;
2. All tankers must have double-sides, and double hulls are preferred.;
3. A traffic separation scheme organized around the three primary approaches
and centered at Ambrose Light has been established.P
4. It is preferred that tankers carry three more additional crew members than
normal when operating in New York Harbor.
The advantages of an experienced pilot are fairly clear, and the first requirement seems self
explanatory. The use of double-sided ships can reduce the likelihood of oil spillage in the result
of a collision. As such, the second requirement would be important in a heavily congested area
31 In Figure 4, Ambrose Light is off of Sandy Hook. NJ at the center of the dashed circle.
32 J am not making any claim that these are in fact correct assumptions, but rather they are only intended to serve as
h~thetical examples. It may be the case that some are incorrect or unnecessary requirements,
3 This traffic scheme is not a hypothetical assumption, but has been recommended by the lMO.
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such as New York: Harbor where the risks of collision are much greater. As stated before, the use
of traffic routing schemes has been found to greatly reduce the risk of a collision. The IMO
recommends a traffic scheme for New Yor:k: utilizing the three primary approaches to the harbor.
Each approach is divided into two lanes of opposing traffic going to and from New York, with
buoys separating the lanes. The scheme converges on Ambrose Light at the entrance to the
harbor, which acts as a traffic terminal. The additional crew members are preferred in case of
any emergencies that might arise due to the heavy traffic.
I have assumed that the OPA has redefmed "gross negligence" as any ship not meeting
established requirements when operating in the EEZ of the United States. In such a way, any
ship not meeting the requirements for safe operation in New York Harbor faces unlimited
liability in case of an accident, The third-party insurance companies, as an industry, see clear
advantages in the use of a pilot familiar with local waters and conditions and agree that they will
require this on any boat they insure as individual firms.

They also recognize that traffic

separation schemes reduce the risk: of an accident occurring and as SUCh, reduce their chances of
having to make payments on a claim. The industry agrees to put an underwriting clause in all
policies, which invalidates the policy when the insured ship, traveling to or from New York
Harbor, is not acting in accordance with the established routing scheme. All insurers also see the
advantages to double-hulls and more crew members, because they reduce the risk of an accident
They, naturally, decide to lower premiums for ships incorporating these advantages. It is over
the required double-sides that the ind ustry disagrees .

I will assume the industry, for

simplification sake, is composed of three firms. Since the industry is perfectly competitive, the
three firms have identical premiums. 1 and 2 find that the risks of insuring a tanker in New York.
Harbor without double-sides, if faced with unlimited liability in the case of an accident, is too
great.

They incorporate sanctions into their policies on all tankers without double-sides

operating around New York. Insurer 3, on the other hand, decides to continue insuring tankers
without double-sides but adjusts his premium upward accordingly to reflect the greater risk of a
large claim when faced with unlimited liability.
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So far, I have looked at the hypothetical reactions of legislation and insurers when faced
with this scenario. To complete the analysis, let us look at the reaction of the insured. The
insured faces the greatest liability for pollution damages, and their principal concern is pollution
liability insurance. Pollution liability insurance is often obtained through P&I clubs. Since these
Clubs often spread their risks and reinsure with third-party insurers. they must necessarily
enforce the requirements outlined by third-party insurers when offering pollution liability
insurance.
For simplification purposes, I am dealing with a sample population of two ships, A and
B. Tanker A is a large conglomerate that has enough assets to self-insure if it chooses and is
registered in Great Britain. However, A under most conditions will not self-insure and prefers to
spread the risks. Weighing the risk of facing unlimited liability of its own assets versus the cost
of an experienced New York Harbor pilot, tanker A decides to stick with its policy and meet the
pilot requirements. When deciding whether to put double-sides on the ship, A has three different
options to consider. The first is self insuring and in the case of an accident, again facing
unlimited liability and risking its assets. The second possibility is to construct double-sides and
use an independent insurer. The shipowner is indifferent between insurers, in this case, because
their premiums are equal. The final possibility for A is to insure with Agent 3 and operate
without double-sides. The shipowner finds that independent insurance is an advantage in either
case. He also determines that the decrease in premium for having double-sides is greater per
year than the cost to build the double-sides. Tanker A also realizes that the additional cost of
building a double-bull is less than the reduction in his premium that he will receive for having
the second hull. As SUCh. the owner of Tanker A chooses to update his ship with a double-hull.
He also fmds it cost effective to obey all routing schemes, based on the same argument for
having an experienced pilot Finally, the shipowner determines that the cost of three crew
members. under British Shipping Law, is much greater than the reduction he would receive in his
premium and chooses not to hire the additional crew .
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Tanker B is Liberian registered and has limited assets.

The shipowner must use

independent insurance to meet financial responsibility requirements in the U.S. Since insurers
require a harbor pilot, he is forced to bear the cost of an experienced pilot familiar with New

York waters. The shipowner also finds that it is better to build the double-sides than use the
insurer that does not require their use. However, since tanker B does not frequently enter New
York Harbor, his premium reduction is less than the cost of building a double-hull and chooses
not to do so. The threat of unlimited liability and no insurance places far too great a risk on
Tanker B' 5 assets. and it is, economically, in his best interest to obey the routing schemes. The
cost of hiring three additional crew members under Liberian regulation is less than the reduction
the shipowner would receive in his premium. and he chooses to hire the additional manpower.
Once again, I am not advocating these particular precautions or attempting to predict a
shipowner's reactions to a particular situation.P' But rather, this application of the principles
outlined in this thesis offers a theoretical scenario. It shows that insurance can be an effective
means of regulation, in that the precautions taken by the insured and required by the insurer are
undertaken out of their own economic best interest. Furthermore. their implementation does
indeed improve safety standards. Finally because all parties are acting in their best interest,
I

insurance is a self-enforcing and cost-effective monitoring system.

Conclusion
The question originally posed in the introduction must be asked again. What role can
marine insurance play in controlling pollution from marine oil spills? As an environmentalist,
my temptation is to suggest that every precaution be taken to prevent marine oil pollution. As an
economist however, I recognize this to be a potentially inefficient solution. Numerous safety
measures that benefit society may Dot be cost-effective. These standards, which cannot be
justified by the resulting magnitude of the reduction in claims, are not the domain of marine
34 A shipowner's costs and benefits are influenced by numerous factors. To attempt to predict shipowners'
reactionsto implementing higher standards requiresan analysis of great extent and is a thesis topic in itself.
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insurance. Once again, I make DO attempt to suggest the proper precautions or safety measures.

In many cases, this depends on each individual situation. Regardless though, a study of general
cost-effective means would most certainly require another thesis of equal size. My attempt is to
suggest a process by which the most knowledgeable parties have an incentive to institute all cost
justified precautions.
Insurance's means of control is through the use of underwriting clauses and risk-based
premiums that promote cost-effective safety measures. These are the most efficient means of
control, because insurers and tanker owners alike are acting in their own economic best-interest.

In such a way, the precautions taken by shipowners will be highly effective in reducing pollution,
because a tanker will only undertake measures that bring a reduction in premiums that outweigh
their costs. Likewise, insurers will only find it beneficial to reduce premiums if the precaution
significantly reduces their risk of pollution claims.

These controls should be applied to

improving safety in the areas of crew training, hull and equipment design and maintenance, and
IMO routing schemes and areas to be avoided.
The role of insurance is clear, but where does it fit into the existing framework? There
are three conditions where insurance can playa constructive role. The first is when it acts in
conjunction with existing legislation. In this situation, insurance does not establish the standards
but acts as an enforcement agent. Underwriting sanctions, which enforce safer conditions, are
most effective when working in conjunction with Federal legislation. Routing schemes and areas
to be avoided are excellent examples of how this method of control can be applied to reduce oil

spills. When a national government requires compliance with a precaution, their greatest
difficulty lies in enforcing those standards. By placing unlimited liability on tankers in these
situations. the insurer who has underwritten a $700 million pollution liability policy faces far
greater risks than under normal limited liability conditions. When a tanker is not in compliance
with established regulations. an insurance company's costs rise. In such a way, they act as the
enforcement A tanker faced with unlimited liability and no insurance has the incentive to follow
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established regulations even at an additional cost, as long as the risk reduction outweighs the
costs. For example, let's assume the government has established the channel between two
islands off limits to tanker traffic because of a fragile ecosystem. The tanker ignores the
regulations, because going around the island increases the costs of the journey by several
thousand dollars. Furthermore, the Coast Guard presence is understated due to their limited
resources. IT the government regulation also says that the tanker faces unlimited liability, the
insurer is forced to rethink the risk of paying out a large claim. They void coverage on all tanker
traffic in this channel. With possible pollution damages amounting to billions of dollars, the
tanker now finds it in his best interest to avoid the short-cut and circumvent the island.
The second condition is when insurance does not enforce federal standards of port states,
but acts as catalyst to speed up the transition to the improved precautions. Nationallegislation
provides sufficient time for the transitions to occur. For example, the OPA allows some ships
until the year 2015 to refit with double hulls. While I am not indicating that double-hulls are
cost-effective, if they are insurance can quicken the process by offering premium incentives to
ships with double-hulls. This encourages owners with single-hull ships to refit sooner. Finally,
insurance can act in lieu of effective federal legislation and international agreements and as a
transitionary measure until all port states pass adequate national legislation. In this role,
insurance must act to establish and enforce the standards. Fortunately, many of the international
agreements have outlined sufficient standards, but governments are simply failing to enforce
them. The insurance industry can act as this international enforcement agency.
Does the current system approximate the ideal? If not, where is the system defective?
Dearly we have not achieved the ideal situation. The most effective solution is for port states to
establish undisputed standards for ships operating in their EEZ and leave insurance to the role of
enforcing these standards. The U.S. has made significant gains toward achieving this Utopia and
has come further than any other nation with the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. But we are not there

yet For insurance to be effective, "gross negligence" and "willful misconduct" must be clearly
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defined to correspond with the provisions of insurance underwriting clauses. The insurance
industry, acting in accordance with U.S. law, can threaten non-eooperating firms with unlimited
liability and no insurance. For example, the U.S. government must agree upon routing schemes
and areas to be avoided in U.S. waters. "Gross negligence" and "willful misconduct" should be
defined to include any ship not in accordance with the outlined conditions. The insurance
industry can now effectively use underwriting clauses to enforce compliance. Finally, the U.S.
needs to incorporate all oil pollution legislation under one federal law that limits liability under
most situations. States should not have their own rights to establish liability limits, as they do
now. IT tankers are always forced to face multiple jurisdictions and unlimited liability, the costs
of operating in the United States will become too high, especially in terms of insurance
premiums. The shipowners will simply refuse to transport oil to me U.S., which as we have seen
has already begun to occur. This is not a viable option, since the U.S. is dependent on foreign

imports of oil.
Foreign governments must take the first step by establishing comprehensive oil pollution
legislation similar to the OPA. In the aftermath of the Braer disaster, Great Britain has come
under fire for lacking this sort of legislation. This brings the thesis back to the question, I

originally started with: Could the Braer spill have been prevented? And, if so, why wasn't it?
The inquiry into the Braer accident is still far from over, and a definite cause has not
been determined. Perhaps, in this case it was an accident that could not have been prevented.
But one thing is definite, the Braer was a high risk ship that failed to meet many international
standards, and many of the areas in which it was sub-standard could have been influenced by the
marine insurance industry. For starters, the Braer was an old ship that sailed under a flag of
convenience, both high risk: categories. Furthermore, the crew did not share a common language;

they were a mix of Polish, Filipino and Greek (Prynn 1993, p. 2). The International Transport
Workers' Federation did not issue the ship a "blue certificate", because it did not meet minimum
standards for crew conditions (Clancy 1993, p. 1). It is also believed that proper maintenance of
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the fuel tank ventilators should have been sufficient to prevent seawater from entering the engine
("Wreck..." 1993, p. 15). An auxiliary generator to lower the anchor could have possibly
prevented the ship from drifting into the rocks. Finally, many advocates feel tanker traffic
should be restricted from this shipping lane South of the Shetland Islands because of the
environmental sensitivity of the area and the severity of the winter storms. In conclusion,
improved crew, equipment and maintenance standards would have improved the safety of the

Braer, and enforced routing schemes would have prevented the Braer from traveling through
this stormy channel. Marine insurance could provide a self-enforcing means of implemen ring
these higher levels of precaution.
Long strides have been made toward eliminating marine oil pollution, but the remaining
journey is still a long one. Fortunately, nature has an incredible healing power. The same storm
that caused the Braer spill also ultimately helped clean it up. The oil was effectively dispersed,
and it evaporated into the atmosphere, Even the following day, after the Braer broke apart,
brown oily seas were replaced with a crystal blue ocean, and the air lost the tinge of oil. The

Shetland Islands were fortunate and lucky, but the problem is not yet solved. Should we
mistakenly think so, just ask: the people of Valdez., Alaska. They will teU you otherwise.
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